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HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during theTSurvey period occurred through judicial decisions.
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Ripeness was the subject of a number of opinions during the Survey
period. In Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson,1 a challenge was made to a
school district's student promotion policy, which required students to ob-
tain satisfactory scores on a standardized assessment test in order to ad-
vance to the next grade. Plaintiff sued for injunctive relief to prevent the
school district from implementing the testing plan and alleged that "mi-
nority students in the district will be harmed because they will fail the
exams in disproportionate numbers and therefore be retained under the
new policy."'2 Although the school district raised ripeness for the first
time on appeal, the supreme court addressed the issue because "ripeness
and standing are components of subject matter jurisdiction that cannot be
waived."' 3 In addressing the issue, the supreme court observed that,
under the ripeness doctrine, the court considers whether, at the time a
lawsuit is filed, the facts are sufficiently developed "so that an injury has
occurred or is likely to occur, rather than being contingent or remote."4
According to the court, "[a] case is not ripe when determining whether
the plaintiff has a concrete injury depends on contingent or hypothetical
facts, or upon events that have not yet come to pass."'5 In this case, the
court concluded that at the time the suit was filed, the alleged harm to the
students caused by retention was still contingent on uncertain events.
"Although it [was] well-documented that minority pass rates [on certain
standardized tests] have been disproportionately lower than white stu-
* B.B.A, New Mexico State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Part-
ner, Figari Davenport & Graves, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., Dickinson College; J.D., New York University. Partner, Figari Davenport &
Graves, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
*** B.S. University of Colorado; J.D., Boston University. Partner, Figari Davenport &
Graves, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
1. 22 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2000).
2. Id. at 850.
3. Id. at 851.
4. Id. at 852 (quoting Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & Southeast Tex.,
Inc., 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998).
5. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d at 852.
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dents' pass rates, there was no evidence in this record that minorities will
fail to be remediated in disproportionate numbers" by the school dis-
trict's program.6 Accordingly, because plaintiffs' alleged injury remained
contingent on the results of both the standardized tests, and if necessary,
the remediation program, their claim was not ripe for review. 7
In Texas Dep't of Banking v. Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass'n.,8 the issue
was "whether certain funds from prepaid funeral contracts escheat to the
State by virtue of the abandoned-property laws." 9 The plaintiff, a ceme-
tery association, brought an action requesting injunctive relief to prohibit
the State from requiring delivery of the allegedly abandoned funds to the
Comptroller and a declaration that plaintiff was not required to deliver
the funds at issue to the Comptroller.t 0 Although the State had sent a
notice of statutory violation to the plaintiff, and the letter had been re-
ferred to the Comptroller for enforcement action, the State argued that
the action was not ripe because the cemetery association had not actually
suffered any injury (i.e., had not been required to remit any of the pre-
paid funds) and there was no agency order in place affecting its rights.
Disagreeing with this contention, the court of appeals noted that "ripe-
ness does not require an actual injury; [rather, plaintiff] is only required
to show that an injury is likely to occur." Although no state agency had
actually undertaken an enforcement action, the court concluded that,
given the notice and referral to the Comptroller for enforcement, the case
was ripe for review. '
Paulsen v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found.l2 concerned issues re-
lated to the Interest on Lawyer's Trust Account ("IOLTA") program. In
this case, an attorney and certain banking associations sued the Texas
Equal Access to Justice Foundation (the "Foundation"), seeking declara-
tory and injunctive relief related to IOLTA. Prior to the filing of the
action, the United States Supreme Court had held that "interest earned
on an IOLTA account is the private property of the clients of the attorney
who established the account" and this holding created uncertainty regard-
ing the constitutionality of the IOLTA program. 13 In Paulsen, the plain-
tiff attorney sought declaratory relief because he claimed to be in an
ethical quandary. If he continued to participate in the IOLTA program,
there was an issue as to whether he breached an ethical duty to his client
if he agreed to turn the interest over to the defendant Foundation. On
the other hand, if he did not give the interest to the Foundation, then he
was concerned that he would be subject to sanctions for ethical violations.
The resolution of these issues centered on how broadly the prior Supreme
6. Id.
7. Id. at 3.
8. 27 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet. h.).
9. Id. at 278.
10. Id. at 280.
11. Id. at 283.
12. 23 S.W.3d 42 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet. h.).
13. Id. at 43-44 (citing Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998)).
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Court decision could be read. The court of appeals concluded that the
attorney was seeking essentially an advisory opinion about the Supreme
Court's decision and that there was no actual justiciable controversy be-
tween the attorney and the Foundation because the parties were all in
agreement that an attorney could ethically participate in the Texas
IOLTA program. 14
As to the banking associations, they claimed to face "uncertainty and
insecurity in the performance of current contracts with the Foundation"
relating to the IOLTA program. 15 Although section 37.004 of the Uni-
form Declaratory Judgment Act provides that "a contract may be con-
strued either before or after there has been a breach,"116 the appellate
court observed that there still "must be some showing that litigation is
imminent between the parties unless the contractual uncertainties are ju-
dicially resolved. ' 17 Although there was a letter from a non-party advis-
ing the banking associations that certain lawyers were planning a class
action against a number of banks related to the IOLTA program, the
court observed that this threat from a stranger was too remote to support
a claim for declaratory relief.18 In short, there was no threat of litigation
by the Foundation and, further, any liability of the banking associations
would be to clients of depositing attorneys, not to the Foundation.
The Texas Supreme Court also had occasion to define what constitutes
a jurisdictional challenge. In Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Jones,19 the su-
preme court drew a distinction between a government's immunity from
liability and its immunity from suit. The former refers to protection of
the State from liability for a judgment even if the Legislature has ex-
pressly consented to the suit. According to the court, immunity from lia-
bility does not affect the court's subject matter jurisdiction.20 On the
other hand, "immunity from suit bars an action against the state unless
the state expressly consents to the suit."' 21 Thus, governmental immunity
from suit defeats a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and is properly
asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. 22
In Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi,23 the supreme court considered
whether the statutory requirements of section 71.031 of the Texas Civil
Practice & Remedies Code, which permits personal injury or wrongful
death actions by a citizen of a foreign country, are jurisdictional. Con-
cluding that the statutory requirements are not jurisdictional, the court
held that a trial court in this type of wrongful death case had jurisdiction
14. Paulsen, 23 S.W.3d at 45-46.
15. Id. at 45.
16. Id. at 46 (quoting TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004(b) (Vernon
1997)).
17. Paulsen, 23 S.W.3d at 46.
18. Id.
19. 8 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. 1999).
20. Id. at 638.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 638.
23. 12 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. 2000).
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based on the general grant of jurisdiction under the Texas Constitution,
not because of compliance with section 71.031.24
The physical location of court proceedings and its effect on jurisdiction
were addressed in two decisions. In Dal-Briar Corp. v. Tri-Angl Equities,
Inc.,25 suit was filed in the 34th Judicial District Court of Hudspeth
County and, at the time of the suit, the 34th Judicial District included
Culberson, El Paso, and Hudspeth counties. After the filing of the suit,
Hudspeth and Culberson counties were removed from the 34th Judicial
District and the Legislature created the new 394th judicial district com-
prised of Brewster, Culberson, Hudspeth, Jeff Davis and Presidio coun-
ties. Accordingly, the case was transferred as a matter of law to the 394th
District. Thereafter, the district court judge conducted certain hearings in
El Paso County and also signed an order transferring the case to the 34th
District Court in El Paso County. On appeal, the court held that the
district court was without authority to conduct proceedings in El Paso
because it was not in the 394th Judicial District where the suit was pend-
ing at the time of the hearings.26 Thus, any orders entered as a result of
such El Paso hearings were void and of no effect. As to the transfer or-
der, however, appellants failed to establish where that order was signed
and, accordingly, relying on a presumption in favor of jurisdiction, the
court of appeals held that the transfer order was not invalid.27
The trial in Cruz v. Hinojosa2 8 occurred, in part, at a Knights of Co-
lumbus hall located across from the courthouse in Starr County. Article
V of the Texas Constitution provides that a court "shall conduct its pro-
ceedings at the county seat of the county in which the case is pending,
except as otherwise provided by law."'29 The term "county seat" has been
defined as "'that town or city where the seat of the county government is
located, where the courthouse is, where the courts are held and the
county officers perform their functions' or 'the place where the court-
house is situated." 30 Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the trial
at the hall was within the county seat and, therefore, the trial court had
jurisdiction to conduct proceedings at that location.31
Finally, the courts addressed a number of miscellaneous issues related
to jurisdiction. In Bridas Corp. v. Unocal Corp.,32 the court of appeals
considered whether the trial court has jurisdiction to issue an anti-suit
injunction while the final judgment of the case is pending on appeal. Sev-
eral months after appeal had been filed, a party obtained an injunction
from the trial court prohibiting the other side from proceeding with the
24. Id. at 76.
25. 22 S.W.3d 520 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, no pet. h.).
26. Id. at 522-23.
27. Id. at 523.
28. 12 S.W.3d 545 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet. h.).
29. Id. at 548 (quoting TEX. CONST. art. V, § 7).
30. Id. at 548-49.
31. Id. at 549.
32. 16 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
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filing of a lawsuit in a foreign country. On appeal, the enjoined party
complained that the trial court was powerless to enter the anti-suit injunc-
tion because, in light of the appeal and the passage of time, the court no
longer had jurisdiction. Disagreeing with this contention, the court of ap-
peals noted that the trial court continues to retain jurisdiction to protect
or enforce its judgment while a case is pending on appeal and accord-
ingly, an anti-suit injunction was appropriate. 33
In Weidner v. Sanchez,34 a personal injury suit was filed in the county
court at law alleging actual damages of $95,000, which was within the
jurisdictional limits of $100,000 for such county courts. Subsequently,
plaintiff amended the petition to assert that her injuries were now perma-
nent and, therefore, sought actual damages of $210,000. Recognizing
that, in certain instances, jurisdiction continues even if a plaintiff subse-
quently amends the petition by increasing the amount in controversy
above the court's jurisdictional limits, the court of appeals held that the
lower court had jurisdiction.35 In this connection, the court noted that a
subsequent amendment increasing the jurisdictional amount does not af-
fect jurisdiction if the additional damages accrued because of the passage
of time and if there is an absence of proof that allegations in the original
petition were made fraudulently or in bad faith.36 In this case, the appel-
late court found plaintiff and her attorney did not know that her injuries
were permanent at the time she filed the original petition. Rather, her
treating physician did not reach that conclusion until some time after the
suit had been filed, and plaintiff thereafter amended her petition to assert
additional damages based on the permanent nature of the injury. Al-
though defendants offered evidence that plaintiff's attorney had pleaded
the $95,000 value in at least 41 other lawsuits in county court, the court of
appeals held that this "suspicious" pattern did not alone establish bad
faith. 37
In Southwest Intelecom, Inc. v. Hotel Networks Corp.,38 the parties had
stipulated in their contract to "jurisdiction and venue in Ramsey County,
Minnesota as if [the contract] were executed in Minnesota. '39 The court
of appeals did not, however, interpret this clause to mandate that Minne-
sota courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy. Rather, the
court held that the jurisdictional clause only required the parties to sub-
mit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Ramsey County, Minnesota, in the
event that a suit related to the agreement was brought in that state.40
33. Id. at 890.
34. 14 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
35. Id. at 363.
36. Id. at 361.
37. Id. at 361-62.
38. 997 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet denied).
39. Id. at 323.
40. Id. at 325.
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II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
For purposes of statutes of limitation, the mere filing of a lawsuit is not
sufficient to meet the requirements of bringing suit within the limitations
period. To "bring suit," a plaintiff must file his action and have the defen-
dant served with process.41 When a plaintiff does not serve the defendant
until after the limitation period runs, the date of service relates back to
the date suit was filed only if plaintiff exercises diligence in effectuating
service. Two cases addressed the sufficiency of a plaintiff's efforts to dili-
gently serve process so as to avoid a limitations defense. In Witt v. Hea-
ton,42 suit was brought for personal injuries resulting from a car accident
that occurred on September 7, 1995. On September 4, 1997, the suit was
filed and citation was requested on the same date. Thereafter, the district
clerk mailed the citation to a constable but it was subsequently returned
because the defendant resided outside the constable's jurisdiction. On
December 30, 1997, a letter was sent to a different constable requesting
service of citation upon the defendant who was thereafter served approxi-
mately four weeks later. Given that plaintiff had offered a reasonable
explanation for the delay of service of process, namely, the clerk's error
in sending the citation to the wrong constable, the appellate court held
that summary judgment on the basis of limitations was not warranted. 43
In Boyattia v. Hinojosa,4a plaintiff requested the clerk to issue citation
for a county defendant at the time she filed her original petition and also
directed that the citation be delivered to a constable for service at the
same time. Although the county citation was issued on the day the peti-
tion was filed, the clerk inexplicably delayed three months before deliver-
ing it to the constable for service. Recognizing that "a party may
ordinarily rely on the clerk to perform his duty within a reasonable
amount of time," the court of appeals nonetheless held that "an unex-
plained three-month delay [was] not a reasonable time for the clerk to
deliver a citation. ' 45 Therefore, plaintiff became obligated to make an
effort to ensure that delivery of service was accomplished. 46 Accordingly,
the court concluded that summary judgment based on limitations was ap-
propriate. 47 On the other hand, other defendants were served with pro-
cess within two weeks after the suit was filed. According to the court,
two weeks was not an unreasonable amount of time to allow a clerk to
perform his duties under the rules and, therefore, there was no inaction
by the clerk that plaintiff was obligated to recognize and act upon to
correct.
4 8
41. Broom v. MacMaster, 992 S.W.2d 659, 664 (Tex. App. -Dallas 1999, no pet.).
42. 10 S.W.3d 435 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, no pet. h.).
43. Id. at 438.
44. 18 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet. h.).






Several cases considered the sufficiency of service of process so as to
support a default judgment. In Hercules Concrete Pumping Serv., Inc. v.
Bencon Management & Gen. Contracting Corp.,49 the return of citation
reflected that it had been served on George W. Brock of "Hercules Con-
crete Pumping." The court of appeals found the service to be defective
for two reasons. First, the return did not specify the position held by
"George Brock" with the defendant company, even though Brock had
been identified in the petition as its registered agent. Second, the return
did not establish that "Hercules Concrete Pumping" was the defendant
"Hercules Concrete Pumping Services, Inc."'50
Two courts also addressed procedures that must be followed in order to
serve or to effectuate service through the Secretary of State. In general,
Texas statutes provide that a plaintiff may serve the Secretary of State, as
agent for a corporation, when the corporation fails to appoint or maintain
a registered agent in the State or when its registered agent cannot, with
reasonable diligence, be found at the registered office.5 ' In Nat'l Multiple
Sclerosis Society v. Rice,52 plaintiff first attempted to serve process by
serving the registered agent of defendant corporation, but the citation
was not served because the certified mail was returned unaccepted.
Thereafter, plaintiff served the Secretary of State, but the Secretary of
State was unsuccessful in forwarding citation to the defendant because
process was returned to the Secretary bearing the notation "forwarding
order expired." Other than the foregoing, there was nothing in the re-
cord that described the attempts made to locate and serve the registered
agent of the defendant corporation. Under those circumstances, the
court concluded that plaintiff did not use "reasonable diligence to locate
the agent and to serve him before she attempted substitute service
through the Secretary of State. '53 In Interaction, Inc. v. State of Texas,54
the State attempted to serve citation on the defendant company's regis-
tered agent, but such service was not executed because the registered
agent had moved to Lebanon. The name and title of the defendant com-
pany's vice president and his address were handwritten on the return.
Rather than serving the vice president, however, the State then effectu-
ated substitute service on the defendant company through the Secretary
of State. Appealing from a default judgment, defendant contended that
the State should have served the vice president whose name and address
were noted on the first return of service. The court of appeals concluded
that the State was not required to attempt service on another corporate
officer before employing substitute service on the Secretary of State.55
49. No. 01-99-00665-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 959 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2000, no pet. h.).
50. Id. at *6.
51. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 2.11(B) (Vernon 1980); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 1396-2.07(A) (Vernon 1997).
52. 29 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, no pet. h.).
53. Id. at 177.
54. 17 S.W.3d 775 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet. h.).
55. Id. at 779.
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Two courts considered the lack of verification on a return of service as
affecting its validity. In Dolly v. Aethos Communications Sys., Inc.,56 the
trial court entered an order allowing substitute service on the defendant
by, among other things, allowing it to be attached to the door at defen-
dant's usual place of residence and also required the return of service to
be verified. Subsequently, a return was filed, and on the bottom of the
return and after the signed verification, it stated "posted to front door."
Finding that this return was defective, the court noted that verification
was deficient because the language "posted to front door" was ambiguous
and appeared after the verification. Moreover, the court observed that
the blanket statement that a citation was executed pursuant to rules of
procedure, even if verified, is not sufficient; rather, it must verify specific
facts related to the act of service. 57 In Bautista v. Bautista,58 service was
effectuated through a private process server pursuant to Rule 107. 59 Rec-
ognizing that Rule 107 requires return of service of process to be verified,
the court of appeals reversed a default judgment because the return in
this case, although reflecting service, was not verified. 60
Rule 103 provides that "citation" may be served anywhere by any sher-
iff or constable or other person authorized by law or, by any person au-
thorized by "written order of the court who is not less than eighteen years
of age."' 61 The rule further provides that "no person who is a party to or
interested in the outcome of a suit shall serve any process. '62 In Palomin
v. Zarsky Lumber Co.,6 3 the appellate court held that service by a book-
keeper of the law firm representing the plaintiff was not in violation of
Rule 103.64 Importantly, the court determined that the bookkeeper had
served process after her normal work hours at the law firm, that she re-
ceived a separate fee for serving defendant, and was not working as an
employee of the law firm when she served process.65
In Renaissance Park v. Davila,66 the court considered an issue of first
impression under section 92.003 of the Texas Property Code, which de-
fines who is a landlord's agent for service of process.67 In this case, the
defendant owned certain apartments in which plaintiff had formerly been
a tenant. Apparently, at the time she had been a tenant, the apartments
were owned by another company. Pursuant to section 92.003, plaintiff
effectuated service on the defendant's on-premises manager or rent col-
lector at the apartments. The court of appeals, however, concluded that
56. 10 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet. h.).
57. Id. at 389.
58. 9 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
59. TEX. R. Civ. P. 107.
60. Bautista, 9 S.W.3d at 251.
61. TEX. R. Civ. P. 103.
62. Id.
63. 26 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet. h.).
64. Id. at 695.
65. Id. at 695.
66. 27 S.W.3d 252 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet. h.).
67. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.003 (Vernon 1995).
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the service was defective because plaintiff did not affirmatively allege, as
required by the Property Code, that she had not received written notice
of the name and address of the management company or the owner of the
building before serving the on-premises manager or rent collector. More
importantly, the court held that plaintiff was not entitled to invoke sec-
tion 92.003 because she did not allege a landlord-tenant relationship had
ever existed between herself and the defendant. 68 The court held that,
"in order for a tenant to serve a landlord under section 92.003, the tenant
must allege that she had a landlord-tenant relationship with that particu-
lar landlord at some point in time."' 69 The court, however, declined to
decide whether, in order to take advantage of section 92.003, the tenant
must allege that the landlord-tenant relationship existed at the time of
service. 70
Finally, in In the Interest of A. Y.,71 the court discussed the requirements
for publication notice in order to terminate a parent-child relationship.
In this case, the trial court entered an order allowing publication notice
after a state official had filed an affidavit to the effect that she had been
unable to locate the absent father or his current address, although she
had discovered that he last lived in Memphis, Tennessee. Subsequently,
citation was published in El Paso. On appeal, counsel for the absent fa-
ther complained that publication of citation was inadequate as it should
have been published in Memphis, Tennessee, the last known place that
the absent father had lived. The court of appeals, however, determined
that "in suits affecting the parent-child relationship, citation by publica-
tion may be served as in other civil cases," and that, except for certain
suits involving land, publication citation is to be made in the county
where the suit is pending.72 Accordingly, the court concluded that publi-
cation notice was sufficient and did not violate the due process rights of
the absent father, particularly as he had not been seen, communicated
with, or supported his children for many years.73
III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
As most practitioners are aware, challenges to personal jurisdiction are
asserted in state court by means of a special appearance. Two cases dur-
ing the Survey period addressed procedures related to special appear-
ance. Recognizing that the plaintiff has the initial burden to plead
sufficient allegations to show jurisdiction in Texas, the court in Frank A.
Smith Sales, Inc. v. Atlantic Aero, Inc.,74 considered whether the plaintiff
had met its burden. As an initial matter, the court observed that it was an
unanswered question under Texas law as to whether the court should
68. Davila, 27 S.W.3d at 257.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 16 S.W.3d 387 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, no pet. h.).
72. Id. at 389.
73. Id. at 389-90.
74. 31 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet. h.).
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look only to the plaintiff's petition in determining whether this burden
had been met or could consider other documents on file, such as a re-
sponse to the special appearance.75 The court declined, however, to de-
cide that issue because it concluded that the plaintiff had not met its
burden, even considering both the petition and its response to the special
appearance. 76 Specifically, in neither instrument was there any allegation
that the tort in question was committed, in whole or in part, in the State
of Texas. The court did decide, however, that an argument made at a
hearing on the special appearance could not be considered a "pleading"
and, hence, such argument could not serve as a basis for satisfying the
plaintiff's initial burden to plead sufficient allegations to show jurisdiction
in Texas.77
In N803RA, Inc. v. Hammer,78 defendants were sued for alleged defi-
cient work on an airplane, which was performed in the State of Florida.
After suit was filed, defendants sent a pro se letter on company letter-
head to the district clerk denying the petition's allegations and requesting
that the suit be dismissed. Additionally, at the end of the letter, defend-
ants noted that all of the work was performed in Florida and none per-
formed in Texas. Subsequently, defendants hired a Texas attorney who
filed a verified special appearance, which was sustained by the trial court.
On appeal, the principal issue was whether the earlier letter constituted a
general appearance and, hence, a waiver of defendant's challenge to per-
sonal jurisdiction. The court of appeals held that the letter was an answer
because defendants had "responded to the petition and asked the court to
make a judgment on the case, which constituted an answer. '79 Relying
on Rule 120a,80 the court observed that a special appearance may be con-
tained in the same instrument as an answer without waiver of such special
appearance, and the special appearance may be amended to cure de-
fects.81 Here, the court determined that, although the letter constituted
an answer, it did contain a challenge to the court's jurisdiction because
defendants contended that they did not belong in a Texas court for work
that took place exclusively in Florida. Hence, they did not waive their
challenge to jurisdiction. 82 In reaching that result, the court noted that
"pro se pleadings should be liberally construed. '83
IV. VENUE
The appellate courts continue to wrestle with venue issues under sec-
tion 15.003 of the venue statute, which governs suits in which multiple
75. Id. at 746.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 748.
78. 11 S.W.3d 363 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
79. Id. at 366.
80. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a.
81. Hammer, 11 S.W.3d at 366.




plaintiffs seek to maintain venue in a single county. 84 In general, this
statute provides that, "in a suit where more than one plaintiff is joined
each plaintiff must, independently of any other plaintiff, establish proper
venue."' 85 A plaintiff "who is unable to [independently] establish proper
venue may not join" in the suit unless certain requirements are met, in-
cluding a showing that "there is an essential need to have the [plaintiff's]
claim tried in the county in which the suit is pending. ' 86 In Am. Home
Prods. Corp. v. Bernal,87 a suit involving the Fen/Phen diet drug, plain-
tiffs contended that they had established the essential need because the
plaintiffs had joined together for the purpose of achieving "mutual sup-
port" and to derive a "significant economic benefit" from joining to-
gether, and it would benefit all the parties to avoid duplicative discovery
caused by multiple lawsuits. Relying on an earlier supreme court deci-
sion,88 the court held that a need to pool resources did not constitute an
"essential need" within the meaning of section 15.003.89 Further, the
court of appeals observed that plaintiffs could have sued in the county of
defendants' residence and, thereby, received the benefits from pooling
their resources. 90
Section 15.003 also provides for an interlocutory appeal under that sec-
tion of the venue statute.91 In Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Adams,92 an-
other fen/phen case, the trial court found that each plaintiff had
independently established proper venue in accordance with section
15.002 (setting forth the general rule of proper venue) and section 15.005
(dealing with venue as to multiple defendants). Appealing from this ad-
verse decision, the defendant asserted that the court of appeals had juris-
diction over any ruling by a trial court in a multi-plaintiff case, regardless
of the stated basis for the ruling in the trial court's order. Disagreeing
84. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 2001).
85. Id. § 15.003(a).
86. Section 15.003(a) provides:
In a suit where more than one plaintiff is joined each plaintiff must, indepen-
dently of any other plaintiff, establish proper venue. Any person who is una-
ble to establish proper venue may not join or maintain venue for the suit as a
plaintiff unless the person, independently of any other plaintiff, establishes
that:
(1) joinder or intervention in the suit is proper under the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure;
(2) maintaining venue in the county of suit does not unfairly prejudice another
party to the suit;
(3) there is an essential need to have the person's claim tried in the county in
which the suit is pending; and
(4) the county in which the suit is pending is a fair and convenient venue for
the person seeking to join in or maintain venue for the suit and the persons
against whom the suit is brought.
Id.
87. 5 S.W.3d 344 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.).
88. Surgitek, Bristol-Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1999).
89. Bernal, 5 S.W.3d at 348 (citing Surgitek, 997 S.W.2d at 604).
90. Id.
91. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(c).
92. 22 S.W.3d 121 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet. h.).
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with this position, the court of appeals held that it did not have jurisdic-
tion where, as here, the trial court had based its venue decision expressly
on another section of the venue statute.93 In Dayco Prods., Inc. v.
Ebrahim,94 a number of plaintiffs filed suit against the defendant and,
after the court denied defendant's motion to transfer venue, additional
plaintiffs were joined. Defendant then filed a motion for reconsideration
and motion to transfer as to the new plaintiffs. Thereafter, the trial court
denied the motions and defendant appealed pursuant to section 15.003.
The court of appeals held that defendant's "motion for reconsideration
did not extend its time for filing an interlocutory appeal" under section
15.003. 95 Given that defendant did not file its notice of appeal within the
20-day time limit for such an interlocutory appeal, the court held it was
without jurisdiction to consider defendant's appeal as to the trial court's
original determination, although the appeal was timely as to the ruling on
the subsequently-added plaintiffs. 96 Finally, in Labrador Oil Co. v. Nor-
ton Drilling Co.,9 7 the appellate court held that section 15.003 does not
afford a right of interlocutory appeal in regard to venue determinations
related to the joinder of multiple defendants under section 15.005 of the
venue statute. 98
In City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich,99 the Texas Supreme Court considered
a city's challenge to venue provisions under the Whistle-Blower Act,
which allow a plaintiff to bring suit in the county in which the plaintiff
resides or in Travis County. 100 In this case, plaintiff had sued a city (Fort
Worth) in Travis County. The City asserted that it was unconstitutional
to require it to submit to an inconvenient venue. Disagreeing with this
contention, the supreme court noted that the legislature has the power to
require a city to submit to an inconvenient venue. The court also rejected
the city's contention that venue in Travis County violated separation of
powers because it allegedly allowed Travis County courts to review the
administrative decisions of a far-removed local government. 10 1 In this
connection, the court observed that the Texas Constitution only guaran-
tees separation of the state legislative, executive, and judicial branches of
the government. 102
In Berg v. AMF, Inc.,103 the court of appeals addressed the Texas fo-
rum non conveniens statute in a case involving events in a foreign coun-
try. In this occupational injury case, the plaintiff, a former Canadian but
a current Arizona resident, worked for a Canadian subsidiary and had
93. Id. at 124.
94. 10 S.W.3d 80 (Tex. App.-TyIer 1999, no pet. h.).
95. Id. at 83.
96. Id.
97. 10 S.W.3d 717 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet. h.).
98. Id. at 719-20.
99. 29 S.W.3d 62 (Tex. 2000).
100. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 554.007 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2001).
101. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d at 72.
102. Id.
103. 29 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
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been exposed to various chemicals as a result of his job of spraying a
coating mixture that was manufactured by the defendant's parent com-
pany in Houston. The court of appeals held that the trial court's dismissal
of the action pursuant to the Texas forum non conveniens statute 10 4 was
not an abuse of discretion.10 5 In this connection, the court observed that,
even if Canadian law was more unfavorable to the plaintiff, that should
not be given substantial weight. 10 6 Instead, the court placed particular
emphasis on the fact that (a) the majority of the witnesses in the case
were located in Canada; (b) a review of the Canadian plant would be
imperative; and (c) the treating physicians and the witnesses to the use of
the chemicals were all located in Canada. 0 7 Additionally, the court also
addressed an exception in the forum non conveniens statute, which "pro-
hibits a judge from dismissing the case if the party opposing dismissal can
make a prima facie showing that an act or omission that was a proximate
or producing cause of the injury or death occurred in [Texas]."' 08 The
court found the exception to be inapplicable. Although the plaintiff had
established that the chemicals were mixed in and shipped from Houston
for use in Canada and that he suffered severe pulmonary disease as a
result of his exposure to chemicals in the 1970s, he had not offered proof,
particularly expert testimony, that the chemicals that were mixed in
Houston and shipped to Canada caused the kind of lung damage that he
had sustained. 0 9
Section 5(B) of the Texas Probate Code authorizes a statutory probate
court to transfer a suit pending in a district or other court to the probate
court when the suit in the non-probate court is one in which a personal
representative of an estate pending in the probate court is a party.110 In
re Ramsey,"' a suit involving the affairs of a partnership in which the
decedent had been a partner, was instituted in district court. The repre-
sentative of the decedent's estate was, however, named to the suit, and
the probate court ordered that the partnership action be transferred to it.
The court of appeals held that, although venue of the partnership suit
may have been appropriate where it was filed, the express transfer au-
thority granted by section 5(B) applies notwithstanding the venue statute
and, when faced with the probate court's transfer order, the district court
was required to transfer the suit.112
Finally, in Mabon Ltd. v. Afri-Carib Enters., Inc.,113 the Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether a forum selection clause was exclusive. In
104. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(b) (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2001).
105. Berg, 29 S.W.3d at 219.
106. Id. at 216.
107. Id. at 218.
108. Id. at 219 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(f) (Vernon 1997 &
Supp. 2001)).
109. Id. at 220.
110. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(B) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
111. 28 S.W.3d 58 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet. h.).
112. Id. at 61.
113. 29 S.W.3d 291 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
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this case, the clause in question stipulated that the Country of Nigeria
"shall have venue" in regard to the dispute at hand. The court, however,
found that this language did not mean that the dispute could only be re-
solved by Nigerian courts. In this regard, the court construed the lan-
guage as meaning that "Nigerian courts shall be an acceptable venue for
the assertion of claims" but that such language did not provide for exclu-
sive jurisdiction in Nigeria.114 Rather, according to the court, "an en-
forceable forum selection clause must contain explicit language regarding
exclusivity.' 15 The court also held that a motion to dismiss is the proper
method by which to enforce a forum selection clause and, further, a party
can waive its right to enforce such a clause by acting inconsistently with
regard to such right, such as seeking affirmative relief or requesting a jury
trial." 6
V. PARTIES
Class actions continued to be a hot topic during the Survey period. In
Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson,117 the Texas Supreme Court considered, first,
whether a class may be defined by the ultimate liability issue (a "failsafe"
class) and, second, whether an appellate court may redefine an errone-
ously defined class. In this action, plaintiffs claimed that the defendant
gas company had not taken natural gas in ratable proportions from wells
of more than 900 producers. The lower court certified a class that was
defined as all persons who were producers of natural gas sold to the de-
fendant during a specified time period whose gas was taken by the defen-
dant in quantities less than the ratable portions. 18 In deciding that this
definition was erroneous, the supreme court noted that a representative
plaintiff must demonstrate not only that an identifiable class exists, but
that it is susceptible to precise definition, and the class members must be
presently ascertainable by reference to objective criteria.119 In turn, ac-
cording to the court, "this means that the class should not be defined by
criteria that are subjective or that require an analysis of the merits of the
case.' 20 Here, the supreme court found that the trial court's definition
failed to meet this criteria because there was no way of ascertaining
whether a given producer was a member of the class until a determina-
tion of ultimate liability was made as to that person (i.e., defendant had
not ratably taken gas from such person). 121 The supreme court, however,
declined to modify the class definition on appeal. Instead, it remanded
the case for the trial court to consider redefinition. In this regard, the
supreme court was of the view that a remand, rather than a redefinition
114. Id.
115. Id. at 297.
116. Id.
117. 22 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. 2000).
118. Id. at 402.
119. Id. at 403.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 404-05.
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by an appellate court, was more consistent with the trial court's discretion
in regard to class certification and its responsibility to manage a class
action. 122
Subsequently, in Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon,123 the supreme court
reached a similar result. In this DTPA and breach of warranty case, the
court considered a class definition that included "those purchasers of cer-
tain specified Ford vehicles who suffered past or future diminution in
value damages or out-of-pocket expenses from peeling paint and who al-
lege that the cause of the peeling is the lack of spray primer in the paint
process. ' 124 The high court determined that simply including the phrase
"allege" did not overcome the problems with the failsafe class definition
that had been identified in its earlier Intratex Gas decision. In this regard,
the court held that class membership could not be clearly ascertained be-
cause "there [was] no realistic means for the trial court to determine
which class members 'allege that the peeling or flaking was caused by a
defective paint process' so the court would have to undertake a monu-
mental task of inquiring individually into each proposed class member's
state of mind."' 25
Although the Intratex Gas and Sheldon decisions have an important
bearing on the class certification practice in Texas, the supreme court's
decision in Southwestern Ref Co. v. Berna126 is even more significant.
The principal issues in this case were (a) the propriety of certifying a class
of 904 plaintiffs for alleged personal injuries arising from a refinery tank
fire explosion, and (b) a trial plan that was approved by the court of ap-
peals, with some modifications, for the class action.
As modified by the court of appeals, the trial plan envisioned four
phases.127 The first phase addressed the alleged liability of the defend-
ants to the named class representatives on the various legal theories, in-
cluding liability for gross negligence, and whether defendants were
responsible for the explosion and whether the released materials were
capable of causing harm to the class. The second phase was to determine
proximate cause and actual damages for the named class representatives.
The third phase addressed the amount of punitive damages for the entire
class. The fourth and final phase would determine proximate cause and
actual damages for the remaining unnamed class members. Regarding
this trial plan, the fundamental issue was whether class actions were ex-
empt from the supreme court's pronouncement in Transp. Ins. Co. v.
Moriel.128 In Moriel, the court set forth certain procedures for bifurca-
tion of actual and punitive damage issues at trial that, according to the
court, were intended to ensure that punitive damages awards are not
122. Id. at 406.
123. 22 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2000).
124. Id. at 449.
125. Id. at 454-55.
126. 22 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. 2000).
127. Id. at 429-30.
128. 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
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"grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense and have some
understandable relationship to compensatory damages.' 12 9 The supreme
court concluded that class actions were not exempt from the require-
ments of Moriel and that the trial plan endorsed by the court of appeals
did not comply with the legal principles announced in that case. 130 In
particular, the court found fault with the trial plan because it allowed the
jury to decide punitive damages for the entire class without knowing the
severity of the offense or the extent of compensatory damages for each of
the unnamed class members.' 3 '
As to the propriety of class certification in this case, the court focused
on the requirements of Rule 42(b)(4), 132 which requires the trial court to
determine whether common questions of law or fact predominate over
questions affecting only individual class members and whether the class
treatment is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The court held that these elements of
the class action rule had not been met. 133 First, the supreme court ex-
pressly rejected the approach of "certify now and worry later" about how
the case would be tried, a view which had been endorsed by at least some
other courts.134 According to the supreme court, it is improper to certify
a class without knowing how claims can and will likely be tried and, ac-
cordingly, a trial court certification order must indicate how the claims
will be tried so that conformance with Rule 42 may be meaningfully
evaluated. 35
Second, the court considered the application of the class action device
generally in personal injury cases and whether, in this case, individual
issues were likely to predominate common ones. As a general matter, the
supreme court observed that class actions will "rarely be an appropriate
device" for resolving personal injury cases due to individual causation
and damage issues. 136 Here, the court found that the causation and dam-
age issues were uniquely individual to each class member because, among
other things, the proximity of the explosion to each of the class members'
homes varied; there was evidence that prevailing winds blew the smoke
away from certain of the class members' homes; and the class members
were scattered in varied locations (e.g, some were inside their homes,
others were outside, some walking, some driving).137 The court further
found that the trial plan endorsed by the court of appeals would not over-
come this problem because, regardless of whether the defendant was le-
gally responsible for the explosion and whether the released materials
were capable of causing the harm, the answers to those questions would
129. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 433.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(4).
133. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 436-38.






not establish "(i) whether and to what extent each class member was ex-
posed; (ii) whether the exposure was the proximate cause of harm to each
class member; (iii) whether and to what extent other factors contributed
to the alleged harm; and (iv) the damage amount that should compensate
each class member."'1 38 Although the supreme court observed that the
class action device is unquestionably a valuable tool in protecting the
rights of Texas citizens, the class action procedure is not meant to alter
the parties' burdens of proof, right to jury trial, or the substantive re-
quirements to recovery under a given tort.139
Of course, the foregoing trilogy of supreme court cases generated sub-
stantial discussion in subsequent appellate court opinions addressing class
action issues. In Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe,140 two dentists filed suit
against a defendant and its subsidiaries regarding deficiencies in software
packages that were designed to aid dentists in the management of their
records. The dentists asserted claims, individually and on behalf of a
class, for breach of contract, breach of warranty, fraud, negligent misrep-
resentation, estoppel, and violation of the DTPA. Following a five-day
evidentiary hearing, the court certified a class that essentially consisted of
all purchasers of certain versions of defendant's software. Finding that
the trial court had not abused its discretion in certifying the class, the
court of appeals specifically addressed the question of whether common
issues in this case would predominate at trial over individual issues in
light of the Bernal holding. As an initial matter, the court of appeals
observed that there were numerous common issues, such as, the nature of
the defects in the software, the extent of defendant's knowledge about
those defects, defendant's alleged uniform misrepresentations about the
software and technical support that it would provide, and defendant's al-
leged common scheme of sending and billing class members for unsolic-
ited software.141 The court observed that based on the evidence in the
record and the arguments of the parties at the class certification hearing,
these common issues were the most heavily disputed and would be the
focus of most of the trial court's and parties' efforts. Further, the court of
appeals distinguished this case from the situation presented in Bernal.
First, the court observed that the breach of contract issue was one of the
most significant and that, if the jury answered the question concerning
software programming defect as to one class member, then the issue of
breach would be answered as to all class members.' 42 Further, the court
determined that the issue of damages could be determined on a class-
wide basis from defendant's own records because the plaintiffs sought, as
their primary measure of damages, the disgorgement of the amounts that
had been paid to defendant for the software. Further, the issue of exem-
plary damages was also a common one that could be resolved by asking
138. Id. at 436-37.
139. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 437.
140. 28 S.W.3d 196 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet. h.).
141. Id. at 205.
142. Id. at 206.
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the jury whether defendant committed the alleged acts knowingly. In
short, all of plaintiffs' complaints centered around the conduct of the de-
fendant, not the conduct of the individual class members. 143
The court of appeals also rejected defendant's argument that individual
questions of reliance precluded class certification. The appellate court
concluded that the issue of reliance was relevant only to plaintiff's claims
for common-law fraud and, as a practical matter, the fraud claim was an-
cillary to and subsumed by plaintiffs' DTPA claim which, according to the
court, did not require proof of reliance. 144 Further, in class actions in-
volving allegations of fraud, the court emphasized the importance of dis-
tinguishing between cases where the misrepresentations vary and those in
which the misrepresentations are substantially the same. In the latter
case, class certification is more appropriate. 145 Finally, the court held that
the mere fact that some damages may have to be computed separately for
different class members did not preclude class certification. The court of
appeals held that, even if some damages have to be determined individu-
ally, they may be efficiently determined through proof of claims forms,
individual damage hearings, or other manageable means. Finally, the
court noted that if it accepted defendant's arguments, the class action
mechanism would be rendered virtually useless. 146
Following the Supreme Court's lead in Bernal, the court of appeals in
Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Butler,147 reversed an order certifying a class
on behalf of a power company's customers who allegedly suffered various
damages as a result of power outages triggered by a major ice storm. The
court of appeals found that common issues were not likely to
predominate over individual issues because the class members' damages
were different and the causal link between their injuries and defendant's
conduct could vary from member to member.148 Further, the appellate
court was also influenced by the observation in Bernal that claims for
personal injury are rarely appropriate for class certification and, in this
case, plaintiffs had included claims for personal injuries in their pleadings.
The appellate courts also considered certain procedural issues related
to class actions. In McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Cortez,149 the court of ap-
peals held that a non-settling defendant does not have standing to object
to a preliminary certification of a "settlement only class" against a settling
co-defendant. The court did recognize that there was a possible excep-
tion to this general rule, namely, if the settlement purports to strip the
non-settling defendant of rights of contribution or indemnity from other
defendants, but it did not find such exception to be applicable here.150 In
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 207.
146. Id.
147. 25 S.W.3d 359 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet. h.).
148. Id. at 363.
149. 17 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet. h.).
150. Id. at 309.
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Monsanto Co. v. Davis,151 at a class certification hearing, the trial court
had excluded certain materials offered by defendant from a companion
class action on the basis that defendant had failed to produce those docu-
ments in discovery before the hearing. Finding error with the exclusion
of this evidence, the court of appeals observed that "material on which a
trial court bases its certification ruling need not be admissible evidence"
and that the rules prohibiting introduction of undisclosed material into
evidence at a trial are not applicable to a certification hearing.152
After a class had been certified in a case involving the receipt by defen-
dant of a lender's finance charge for loans secured by anticipated federal
income tax refunds, the lender in H&R Block, Inc. v. Haese153 added a
paragraph to its loan application form utilized by the defendant. The new
paragraph provided, in part, that a borrower's disputes with the lender or
the defendant over the loan agreement or any prior refund loan agree-
ment must be arbitrated and that class actions were prohibited without
the parties' consent. The trial court subsequently entered an order
prohibiting the defendant and its counsel from communicating with or
entering into any agreement with any member of the class as it related to
the foregoing provisions and stating that these provisions were not en-
forceable by any defendant against any member of the class. Recognizing
that a trial court is the guardian of the class as certified and it may take
necessary actions to police the conduct of the proceedings before it and
to protect the integrity of a pending class action, the court of appeals held
that the trial court's order was proper in regard to existing loan agree-
ments and communications about the same. 154 The court concluded,
however, that the trial court abused its discretion to the extent that its
order restricted defendant's communications or agreements with class
members regarding new loans. 155
Finally, in Allegro Isle Condominium Ass'n v. Casa Allegro Corp.,156
the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant relief in a
declaratory judgment action to settle the rights of neighboring property
owners concerning an easement between them. The appellate court
found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant
relief to either party because the mortgagees for the properties in ques-
tion had not been joined.1 57 Although recognizing that the trial court
might have had discretion to proceed with the case, the court of appeals
found that it had not abused its discretion in requiring the mortgagees to
be joined as necessary and proper parties. In this regard, the court noted
that resolution of the easement issue could affect property values and
151. 25 S.W.3d 773 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no pet. h.).
152. Id. at 784-85.
153. No. 13-97-673-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 4408 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000,
no pet. h.).
154. Id.
155. Id. at *13-*14.




thereby affect the mortgagees' security interests.158
VI. PLEADINGS
In Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld,159 defendant alleged that
plaintiff's claim for punitive damages was limited by section 41.008 of the
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code. As it turned out, based on the
date the cause of action in question had accrued, defendant's answer re-
ferred to the wrong section of the Code and, instead, section 41.007 was
the punitive damage cap applicable to this case. Nonetheless, the su-
preme court held that defendant was entitled to a reduction in the puni-
tive damages awarded by the jury. Recognizing that Texas follows a "fair
notice" standard of pleading, the supreme court found that defendant's
answer gave adequate and fair notice to plaintiff, and the trial court of
defendant's intent to invoke the punitive damages cap found in the Texas
Civil Practice & Remedies Code, even though the pleading referred to an
incorrect version of the statute.160 In another decision related to plead-
ings, the supreme court held in Kinnear v. Texas Comm'n on Human
Rights161 that immunity from liability is an affirmative defense. Accord-
ingly, because the defendant in this case never pleaded sovereign immu-
nity, the court held that it had waived such defense.162
Two cases considered the role of special exceptions as a predicate to
the dismissal of an action. In Godley Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Woods,163 defen-
dant alleged that plaintiff's suit was barred because plaintiff failed to ex-
haust administrative remedies. Subsequently, defendant filed a plea to
the jurisdiction on that basis, and the court dismissed plaintiff's claims.
Recognizing that a plea to jurisdiction may be an appropriate vehicle for
raising a failure to exhaust administrative remedies challenge, the court
of appeals decided that dismissal was inappropriate in this case. Because
the plaintiff may have been able to amend its petition to establish the
court's jurisdiction, the appellate court held that plaintiff was entitled to
an opportunity to do so before the plea to jurisdiction could be granted.
Accordingly, the defendant, as the opposing party, had the burden of
prompting the court to alert plaintiff to its pleading defect and should
have done so by a special exception.164 In reaching this result, the Court
observed that, in connection with jurisdictional challenges, a defendant
generally has two choices. If after analyzing the petition, the defendant
believes that the plaintiff cannot amend the petition to show jurisdiction
under any circumstance, it may file a plea to the jurisdiction. If that posi-
tion is correct, the plea should be granted. If, on the other hand, the
petition is susceptible to amendment to show the court's jurisdiction, then
158. Id. at 680.
159. 34 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. 2000).
160. Id. at 896-97.
161. 14 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2000).
162. Id. at 300.
163. 21 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no pet. h.).
164. Id. at 660.
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the defendant should file a special exception and obtain an order to
amend. If the plaintiff fails or refuses to amend and defendant still be-
lieves the pleading does not confer jurisdiction on the court, a plea to
jurisdiction may be filed.165 Similarly, in Hunter v. Johnson,166 the court
held that before a defendant seeks a dismissal for failure to state a cause
of action, he must, as a general rule, file a special exception so that the
plaintiff may have the opportunity to amend his pleading in order to cure
the alleged defect in his claim. 167 The court recognized that special ex-
ceptions are not required, however, when the party pleads itself out of
court, i.e., when the plaintiff's pleadings clearly demonstrate the lack of a
valid cause of action.168
The Texas courts also considered a number of miscellaneous issues re-
lated to pleadings. In Walzier v. Newton,' 69 the court of appeals held that
sole proximate cause is not an affirmative defense and, therefore, evi-
dence on that issue may be introduced without the necessity of pleading
sole proximate cause.' 70 On the other hand, in Johnston v. McKinney
Am., Inc.,' 7' the court held that a defendant, relying upon a warranty
disclaimer, must plead the disclaimer as an affirmative defense.172
Finally, in Mitchell v. Laflamme, 73 a breach of restrictive covenant
case, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to an award of attor-
neys' fees even though his petition did not reference the correct statutory
basis for such an award. The court of appeals noted that, although the
petition sought attorneys' fees under other statutes (albeit not the correct
one), it also included a general prayer for attorneys' fees and contained
sufficient allegations of fact to meet the criteria for an award of attorneys'
fees under the correct statute. 174
VII. DISCOVERY
The Texas courts began to create a body of case law interpreting the
1999 amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure during the Sur-
vey period.
A. DISCOVERY PROCEDURES
The supreme court again revisited the issue of "apex" depositions in In
re Alcatel USA, Inc.175 and In re Daisy Mfg. Co.176 In Alcatel, the court
165. Id. at 661.
166. 25 S.W.3d 247 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, no pet. h.).
167. Id. at 249-50.
168. Id. at 250.
169. 27 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet. h.).
170. Id. at 563-64.
171. 9 S.W.3d 271 (Tex. App.-Houston 1999, no pet. h.).
172. Id. at 280.
173. No. 14-98-00185-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 6845 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
174. Id. at *14.
175. 11 S.W.3d 173 (Tex. 2000).
176. 17 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. 2000).
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made clear that the guidelines for apex depositions it first announced in
Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia'77 involve two discrete tests: first,
if the high-ranking corporate official arguably has any "unique or supe-
rior personal knowledge of discoverable information" the deposition
should be allowed; second, if the foregoing standard is not met, then the
deposition will not be allowed unless the party seeking discovery has at-
tempted in good faith to obtain the information through less intrusive
means, which proved to be unsatisfactory or inadequate, and there is a
reasonable indication that the official's deposition is calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence. 178 The court went on to hold that
these guidelines apply even to business disputes about which high-level
executives are more likely to have some knowledge. 179 Thus, the court
held that merely showing that the two chairmen-level officers at issue in
Alcatel possessed relevant information was insufficient to justify taking
their depositions.18 0 Similarly, in Daisy Mfg., the court held that the
plaintiff's allegation that the defendant's chief executive officer had ulti-
mate responsibility and authority, as well as access to the information on
which discovery was sought, was insufficient to justify allowing his deposi-
tion under the Crown Cent. standard. 18'
Two appellate courts addressed the proper locale of a deposition dur-
ing the Survey period. In Vega v. Davila,182 two Mexican nationals were
served with subpoenas to give their depositions in Corpus Christi while
waiting at the Corpus Christi airport for a flight home after having given
depositions (by agreement) in a related lawsuit.' 83 The court of appeals
first held that, while persons who enter the jurisdiction solely to appear as
witnesses may normally be immune from service of process, the subpoe-
nas in Vega were permissible because the two cases were connected. 184
Further, the court concluded that, under Rule 201(5),185 the foreign na-
tionals were required to appear for their depositions in Nueces County
where they were served.' 86 In Prudential Property and Cas. Co. v. Dow
Chevrolet-Olds, Inc.,187 on the other hand, the court held that a plaintiff
insurance company's filing of a subrogation lawsuit in Texas did not sub-
ject its insureds, who lived in Arizona, to being deposed in Texas since the
insureds were not "parties" to the suit.188
Part of the 1999 amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure was
the addition of Rule 202,189 which combined the former rules governing
177. 904 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1995).
178. Alcatel, 11 S.W.3d at 175-76 (quoting Crown Central, 904 S.W.2d at 128).
179. Id. at 179-80.
180. Id. at 180.
181. Daisy Mfg., 17 S.W.3d at 659-60.
182. 31 S.W.3d 376, 377 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, no pet. h.).
183. Id. at 377-78.
184. Id. at 379-80.
185. TEX. R. Civ. P. 201(5) (Vernon 1986) (repealed 1999).
186. Vega, 31 S.W.3d at 380.
187. 10 S.W.3d 97 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. dism'd).
188. Id. at 104.
189. TEX. R. Civ. P. 202.
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depositions to perpetuate testimony and bills of discovery. Two cases de-
cided during the Survey period addressed the proper procedures under
this new rule. In In re Akzo Noble Chem., Inc.,I 90 the court held that if
suit is anticipated, a petition under Rule 202 must be filed in the county
where venue of the anticipated suit would lie, and not where the witness
resides. 19' The court also held that depositions are the only form of dis-
covery authorized by Rule 202, and, therefore, the trial court erred in
entering an order requiring the relator to make an accident scene availa-
ble for inspection. 192 In Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Gonzalez,193 the court
held that a trial court's order granting a petition under Rule 202 is not
appealable when the deposition is sought in anticipation of filing suit
against the proposed deponent.1 94
In re Guzman195 involved a trial court's order requiring a party to exe-
cute authorizations for the release of documents, including medical and
employment records, by third parties.' 96 The appellate court noted that
the effect of the trial court's ruling was to order the party to create docu-
ments (i.e., the authorizations) that did not already exist.' 97 Finding
nothing in the rules of procedure requiring the creation of documents
solely for the purpose of responding to a request for production, the court
conditionally granted a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to va-
cate its order.1 98
B. PRIVILEGES AND EXEMPTIONS
Under the 1999 amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,
"witness statements" are now generally discoverable'99 and are expressly
excluded from the definition of "work product. ' '2°° The new rules do not
preclude, however, the possibility that a witness statement may be privi-
leged or exempt from discovery for some other reason. 20' Thus, in In re
Fontenot,20 2 the court held that a doctor's narrative report to his attorney
and insurance carrier was protected by the attorney-client privilege and
therefore exempt from discovery, despite the fact that it also qualified as
a witness statement.20 3
190. 24 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, no. pet. h.).
191. Id. at 920.
192. Id. at 921.
193. 18 S.W.3d 673 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999), vacated and dism'd as moot, 33
S.W.3d 821 (Tex. 2000).
194. Id. at 675.
195. 19 S.W.3d 522 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.).
196. Id. at 523.
197. Id. at 525.
198. Id.
199. TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.3(h).
200. TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.5(c)(1). See generally In re Jiminez, 4 S.W.3d 894, 896 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding) (holding witness statement discoverable
over work product objection).
201. TEX. R. Civ. P. 192, cmt. 9.
202. 13 S.W.3d 111 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, orig. proceeding).
203. Id. at 114.
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The supreme court rejected a hyper-technical privilege waiver argu-
ment in In re University of Texas Health Ctr. at Tyler.204 There, the plain-
tiff served three virtually identical deposition notices with accompanying
requests for production of documents.20 5 The defendant served written
objections, a motion for protective order, and a motion to quash in re-
sponse to the first and third deposition notices, but filed nothing in re-
sponse to the second notice. 20 6 The high court held that this failure did
not constitute a waiver, as the defendant had already made its objections
clear and "was not required to reiterate its objections when only the date
and time of the deposition were changed."2 07
The supreme court also reaffirmed, in In re Union Pacific Resources
Co.,208 that a party relying on a non-privilege objection to discovery is not
always required to submit evidence in support of its objections.20 9 The
defendant insurer in that case sought discovery about an unrelated cover-
age dispute the plaintiff had with another insurance carrier.210 The court
concluded that the trial court did not need evidence to determine that the
requested information was irrelevant and not discoverable. 211
Finally, two cases decided during the Survey period demonstrate the
courts' reluctance to allow discovery that unnecessarily burdens or jeop-
ardizes the rights of non-parties. In re Arras21 2 involved a deposition sub-
poena requiring a non-party (an insurance claims representative) to
produce documents containing information that was readily discoverable
from the defendant, including the address and telephone number of the
defendant and the identity of persons with knowledge of relevant facts. 21 3
The court found that, under these circumstances, Rule 192.4214 required
the trial court to grant a motion for protective order since there were
clearly more convenient, less burdensome, and less expensive means for
the plaintiffs to obtain the information (such as requests for disclo-
sure.) 215 In In re Temple-Inland, Inc.,216 the court ordered relators to
produce documents that identified persons who, for a variety of reasons,
were prohibited from entering on premises under the realtors' control.217
However, the court also required that a protective order be entered re-
garding the use of such documents in order to protect the persons identi-
204. 33 S.W.3d 822 (Tex. 2000).
205. Id. at 826.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 22 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. 1999).
209. Id. at 341.
210. Id. at 339.
211. Id. at 341. Indeed, the court noted that it was unclear what evidence the plaintiff
could adduce on the relevancy questions. Id.
212. 24 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. App.-El Paso, 2000, orig. proceeding).
213. Id. at 863.
214. TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.4.
215. Arras, 24 S.W.3d at 864. Indeed, the plaintiffs had already obtained the informa-
tion from defendant through disclosure requests. Id.
216. 8 S.W.3d 459 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, orig. proceeding).
217. Id. at 461-62.
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fied from harassment, annoyance, and invasions of privacy.21 8
C. SANCTIONS
New Rule 193.6(a)2 19 represents a more forgiving standard for the
sanction of exclusion of evidence that was not timely disclosed in discov-
ery, as evidenced by Best Indus. Unif Supply Co. v. Gulf Coast Alloy
Welding, Inc. 220 The plaintiff in that case listed Dagmar Serrata, its credit
manager, as one of two persons with knowledge of relevant facts in re-
sponse to a request for disclosure.2 21 Although Serrata resigned four to
five months before trial and was replaced by Raymond Sebesta, plaintiff's
counsel failed to supplement its disclosures. 222 The trial court refused to
allow Sebesta to testify and, the plaintiff having no other evidence, en-
tered a take-nothing judgment. 223 The court of appeals reversed, holding
that there would be no surprise or unfair prejudice to defendant in al-
lowing Sebesta to testify. 224 In doing so, the court noted that Sebesta
would have testified to the same damage calculations as Serrata, the exact
amounts of which were disclosed in the pleadings, and that the defendant
had never attempted to depose Serrata when it thought that she would be
testifying on that subject.225
Deemed admissions were the subject of Steffan v. Steffan.226 The de-
fendant husband in that case appeared and signed agreed temporary or-
ders but never formally answered. 227 He also failed to respond to
requests for admissions that were served on him.228 Following the entry
of a default judgment against him, the trial court granted the husband's
motion for new trial but would not allow him to withdraw his deemed
admissions or introduce evidence that conflicted with such admissions. 229
On appeal, the court rejected the husband's argument that the requests
for admissions served on him were a legal nullity since he had not an-
swered in the case.230 The court found nothing in the rules of procedure
that prohibits a defendant from being served with requests for admission
before his filing of an answer or other appearance. 231 The appellate court
also held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing to
allow the deemed admissions to be withdrawn, reasoning that the fact
218. Id. at 462-63.
219. TEX. R. CIv. P. 193.6(a).
220. 07-00-0326-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 1031 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Oct. 18, 2000.
no. pet. h.).
221. Id. at *1.
222. Id. at *2.
223. Id.
224. Id. at *8.
225. Id.
226. 29 S.W.3d 627 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
227. Id. at 629.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 629-30.
231. Id. at 630. The court noted there was no due process concern since the husband
had, in fact, received the requests. Id. at n.2.
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that the husband was proceeding pro se did not constitute "good cause"
for his failure to comply with the rules of procedure. 232
VIII. SEALING OF COURT RECORDS
A trial court's ruling that it had continuing jurisdiction to determine
whether documents produced in a lawsuit were "court records" within
the meaning of Rule 76a 233 splintered the Texas Supreme Court in In re
The Dallas Morning News, Inc.234 In the underlying case, the newspaper
intervened under Rule 76a 235 and moved for access to the documents al-
most three months after the trial court's plenary jurisdiction had ex-
pired.236 The trial court concluded that, although no sealing order had
been entered, it had continuing jurisdiction to determine if the documents
were "court records" and set a hearing at which that issue would be de-
termined. 237 The defendants appealed and filed an application for writ of
mandamus. 238 On mandamus, the court of appeals determined that the
district court lacked jurisdiction under Rule 76a239 and directed the dis-
trict court to "vacate its order setting a hearing. '240
In a per curiam opinion, the supreme court held only that the court of
appeal should not have granted mandamus relief.241 Four justices con-
curred in this result on the ground that an adequate appellate remedy
existed and mandamus was therefore inappropriate.242 Moreover, these
justices also stated that the defendants' appeal (which was still pending)
was premature because, at that point, all the trial court had done was
assume jurisdiction and set a hearing to determine if the documents were,
in fact, subject to Rule 76a. 243 Four other concurring justices thought,
however, that mandamus would be an appropriate remedy under the cir-
cumstances but that the court of appeals had wrongly concluded that the
trial court did not retain continuing jurisdiction over the newspaper's at-
tempt to gain access to the documents in question. 244 Finally, Justice
Baker concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that Rule
76a(8) 245 requires a party to appeal, rather than mandamus, any order
relating to the sealing of court records, but disagreeing with the conclu-
sion that the defendants' appeal was premature. 246 Accordingly, Justice
232. Stefan, 29 S.W.3d at 631.
233. TEX. R. Cv. P. 76a.
234. 10 S.W.3d 298 (Tex. 1999).
235. TEX. R. Cv. R. 76a.
236. Dallas Morning News, 10 S.W.3d at 298-99.
237. Id. at 299.
238. Id.
239. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a.
240. In re Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 997 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1998, orig. proceeding).
241. Dallas Morning News, 10 S.W.3d at 299.
242. Id. at 304-05 (Gonzalez, J., concurring).
243. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a; Dallas Morning News, 10 S.W.3d at 305.
244. Dallas Morning News, 10 S.W.3d at 299-303 (Abbott, J., concurring).
245. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(8).
246. Dallas Morning News, 10 S.W.3d at 306 (Baker, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Baker would have remanded the case to the court of appeals to deter-
mine the issue under the appellate standards of review.247
IX. DISMISSAL
The sufficiency of the Bexar County dismissal docket notice was again
the subject of litigation during the Survey period in Scoville v. Shaffer.248
Previously, the Texas Supreme Court, in Villareal v. San Antonio
Truck,249 held that the Bexar County dismissal docket letter violated liti-
gants' due process rights by failing to advise that one possible outcome at
a dismissal docket hearing was the dismissal of the case based upon the
court's inherent power to manage its own docket.2 50 Following the Vil-
lareal decision, the Bexar County clerk specified in its revised dismissal
notice that a dismissal was a possible outcome at a dismissal hearing. In
this legal malpractice suit, after the pro se plaintiff took no action to pros-
ecute his claims for nearly three years, the court clerk sent the new dis-
missal notice. The trial court then dismissed the case and subsequently
refused to reinstate it. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the
revised notice adequately advised the plaintiff of dismissal as a potential
result at a dismissal hearing, which was appropriate given the lack of ac-
tivity on the case.2 51
In Garcia v. Mireles252 the appellate court affirmed the trial court's dis-
missal of the plaintiff's case as a sanction for failing to attend a mediation.
Ironically, plaintiff's counsel had successfully moved the court initially to
order the case to mediation, but later repeatedly rescheduled, and then
failed to attend the mediation. The appellate court affirmed the dismis-
sal, holding that the trial court had authority to dismiss the case under
both Rule 165a 253 and its own inherent power under common law and
that it did not abuse its discretion by granting the defendant's motion to
dismiss the case as a sanction. 254
The El Paso Court of Appeals conditionally granted a writ of manda-
mus compelling the trial court to cease its jurisdictional exercise over a
case that had been dismissed in In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.255 In this slip
and fall case, the trial court issued a notice of intent to dismiss for want of
prosecution and, following a hearing, entered an order dismissing the
case. According to an affidavit from the then-presiding trial judge, how-
ever, this order was entered in error and contrary to the trial court's in-
tent. In fact, the court clerk also had advised counsel that the order had
247. Id.
248. 9 S.W.3d 201 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
249. 994 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Tex. 1999).
250. See Thomas A. Graves, et al., Texas Civil Procedure, 53 SMU L. Rev. 1341,1360
(2000) [hereinafter 2000 Annual Survey].
251. Scoville, 9 S.W.3d at 202.
252. 14 S.W.3d 839 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.).
253. TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a.
254. Garcia, 14 S.W.3d at 843.
255. 20 S.W.3d 734, 736 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, orig. proceeding).
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been mistakenly entered and that the case had not been dismissed. Un-
fortunately for the plaintiff, however, no order was ever entered vacating
the dismissal order, no pretrial order was entered, no trial date was set as
required by Rule 165a,2 56 and no motion to reinstate the case was filed.
Therefore, after the trial court's plenary jurisdiction expired, Wal-Mart
treated the case as dismissed. When the subsequent trial judge attempted
to schedule the case for a pretrial conference, almost two years after the
original dismissal order had been entered, Wal-Mart filed its petition for
writ of mandamus. The appellate court granted the mandamus, conclud-
ing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case following the ex-
piration of its plenary jurisdiction. The court also held that a trial court
was not free to correct judicial errors (unlike clerical errors) after its ple-
nary jurisdiction had expired.257
In a similar case, the court in In re Bokeloh258 conditionally granted a
petition for writ of mandamus to declare as void a trial court's order of
reinstatement entered following the expiration of its plenary power. In
this real estate dispute, the plaintiffs filed suit in August 1998 for alleged
misrepresentations. After the suit had been on file for almost six months,
the trial court notified the plaintiffs of its intent to dismiss for want of
prosecution. In response, the plaintiffs filed a verified motion to retain,
explaining the reason for their difficulties in effectuating service of pro-
cess on some of the defendants. The trial court, nonetheless, dismissed
the case on March 31, 1999. However, the clerk did not send the notice
of the dismissal until April 29, 1999, which plaintiffs' counsel received on
May 3, 1999.
Plaintiffs' counsel immediately advised the clerk of their motion to re-
tain, and the court, on its own motion, reinstated the lawsuit the next day,
on May 4, 1999. Thereafter, all remaining defendants were served and
appeared. In February 2000, in the face of an April 2000 trial setting, the
defendants moved unsuccessfully to have the trial court vacate its order
of reinstatement. Two days before the case was set for trial, the defend-
ants filed their petition for writ of mandamus, which, reluctantly, the ap-
pellate court conditionally granted. Reasoning that because the plaintiffs
moved to retain the case, rather than reinstate it, the trial court had lost
jurisdiction to vacate the order of dismissal, even though plaintiffs' coun-
sel did not receive the notice of the order of dismissal until after the trial
court's plenary jurisdiction had expired. In rationalizing what even the
appellate court acknowledged was a "harsh and unyielding" result, the
court noted that Rule 165a 259 requires a party to file a motion to reinstate,
rather than to retain and that neither the title nor the substance of plain-
tiffs' motion could be rationally construed as a motion to reinstate, which
would have been required to extend the trial court's plenary jurisdiction.
256. TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a.
257. Wal-Mart, 20 S.W.3d at 740-41.
258. 21 S.W.3d 784 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, orig. proceeding).
259. TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a.
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Moreover, because the trial court took none of the procedurally-man-
dated steps under Rule 165a,260 such as notice and a hearing, the court
further declined to treat the motion to retain as motion to reinstate. The
appellate court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that the court's plenary
jurisdiction should have been extended under Rule 306a261 due to the
defect in their late receipt of the notice of the order of dismissal. Because
plaintiffs failed to file a sworn motion, give notice of a hearing, present
evidence of their actual receipt of the notice, or obtain an order contain-
ing written findings regarding their receipt of the notice of dismissal as is
required to reset the commencement of the trial court's plenary power,
the appellate court determined that Rule 306a2 62 was inapplicable. In its
concluding footnote, 63 the appellate court acknowledged the severity of
its ruling, given that the dismissal was initially the result of an administra-
tive error, which then appeared to be cured by the trial court's own ac-
tions, followed by a year of litigation without objection. The court
ultimately concluded, however, that because the procedural defects were
jurisdictional, it had no choice but to reach the conclusion it did, leaving
the plaintiffs with only their bill of review for relief.2 64
In Musquiz v. Harris County Flood Control Dist.,265 involving a land-
owner's appeal of a condemnation award, the court affirmed the dismissal
of an action for failure to prosecute, which inured to the landowner's ben-
efit. After the flood control district filed an action to condemn certain
realty, a special commission entered a monetary award for the value of
the land taken. The landowner filed its objections to the award in district
court, which under the condemnation statute, had the effect of vacating
the award and converting the case into a normal lawsuit in which the
flood control district was the plaintiff. The landowner failed, however, to
serve the flood control district with citation or notice of its objections to
the award. After the case had been on file for nearly a year without ac-
tion, the trial court issued a notice of intent to dismiss for want of prose-
cution. Neither party appeared at the status conference, following which
the trial court issued a notice dismissing the flood control district's cause
of action for want of prosecution. However, forty-four days after alleg-
edly dismissing the case for want of prosecution, the trial court then en-
tered a judgment reinstating the special commission's award and granting
the district a perpetual easement across the landowner's property. The
appellate court reversed, holding that by the time the trial court affirmed
the commission's decision, it lacked plenary power to issue any further
orders. Therefore the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the entire
action, noting the absence of any post-judgment motions after the entry
260. Id.
261. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a.
262. Id.
263. Bokeloh, 21 S.W.3d at 793, n.10.
264. Id. at 793-94.
265. 31 S.W.3d 664 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], no. pet. h.).
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of the original dismissal order. 266
X. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Fort Worth court of appeals in Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp. v.
Carpenter267 extended the holding in Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines
Inc.268 to late filed-summary judgment responses. Specifically, the court
held that a party's late-filed summary judgment response could be consid-
ered as timely filed upon a showing of some excuse (not necessarily a
good excuse), coupled with the absence of intentional failure to respond,
and a prima facie showing that if the summary judgment is set aside, the
moving party will be in no worse position than if the summary judgment
response had been timely filed.
Preservation of error regarding objections to summary judgment evi-
dence remained the subject of disagreement among the appellate courts.
In Well Solutions, Inc. v. Stafford,269 which arose out of an automobile
accident, a third-party defendant moved for summary judgment contend-
ing it had not manufactured the trailer involved in the accident. The non-
moving party responded by attaching summary judgment evidence
designed to disprove the movant's allegations that it had not manufac-
tured the trailer. The movant then objected to this summary judgment
evidence as inadmissible hearsay and incompetent. However, the trial
court did not rule upon these objections orally at the hearing, in a written
order, or in the summary judgment order. The appellate court held that
by failing to obtain a ruling thereon, the movant waived its objections to
the summary judgment evidence. 27° The appellate court rejected the ar-
gument that the trial court implicitly. sustained the objections by granting
the summary judgment motion, thereby declining to follow the holding of
the Fort Worth Court of Appeals,271 which had adopted such reasoning,
and instead electing to follow the holding of a Houston appellate court in
Dolcefino v. Randolph.272 Given this continued split in authority, the
cautious practitioner should still endeavor to secure some form of re-
corded ruling sustaining or overruling objections to summary judgment
evidence to preserve that issue for appeal.
In Garcia v. National Eligibility Express, Inc.,273 the court held that a
party may not rely upon its own interrogatory answers in responding to a
motion for summary judgment, even where the opposition puts them into
evidence and relies upon them. Moreover, the court concluded that the
266. Id. at 668. The appellate court did not address the circumstances regarding the
plaintiff's failure to serve the district with citation.
267. 35 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, no. pet. h.).
268. 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1939).
269. 32 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. App. -San Antonio 2000, no pet. h.).
270. Id. at 316-17.
271. See Frazier v. Yu, 987 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied);
Blum v. Julian, 977 S.W.2d 819, 823-24 (Tex. App.-Forth Worth 1998, no pet.).
272. 19 S.W.3d 906, 926 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
273. 4 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
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interrogatory answers were incompetent summary judgment evidence
and could not create a fact issue, even though the opposing party raised
the issue for the first time on rehearing in the court of appeals. 274
The court in Dickson Construction, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Maryland 75 addressed the length of time permitted for discovery before
a "no evidence" summary judgment motion is considered ripe. In this
case, the defendants originally moved for summary judgment based upon
limitations, which the trial court granted. The appellate court affirmed
that decision with respect to all claims but one for fraud on which it de-
termined that limitations had not yet run. Following a remand of that
claim, the defendants again moved for summary judgment regarding the
plaintiff's fraud claim under Rule 166a(i),2 76 which the trial court granted.
The appellate court affirmed the no evidence summary judgment, noting
that the proper period to consider for purposes of evaluating whether
sufficient opportunity had been given for discovery to occur was not the
length of time the case had been before the trial court following the re-
mand, but the total time the case had been on file since its inception.
Because more than two years had passed since the plaintiff originally
filed suit, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's fraud
claim based upon no evidence of reliance or damages, which the court
reasoned should have been readily available to the plaintiff to prove since
the suit's inception.2 77
In Smith v. McCleskey, Harriger, Brazill, & Graf, L.L.P.,278 the court
reversed and remanded a no evidence summary judgment decision en-
tered in favor of a law firm, holding that the motion was deficient because
it failed to state the elements for which it claimed there was no evidence.
In so ruling, the court found that a general recitation in the summary
judgment motion that it owed no duty to the plaintiff was insufficient to
meet the requirements of Rule 166a(i).2 79
XI. JURY PRACTICE
This year's Survey period yielded a bumper crop of opinions relating to
Texas civil juries, ranging from admissible evidence to prove jury miscon-
duct, jury shuffles, and parties appearing in shackles before juries.
In Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson,280 the Texas Supreme Court
rejected constitutional challenges to the procedural and evidentiary rules
that prohibit testimony regarding jury deliberations to prove juror mis-
conduct.2 81 In this products liability case, the plaintiff moved for a new
trial following a jury verdict in his favor, alleging undisclosed juror bias
274. Id. at 889-90.
275. 5 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. denied).
276. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
277. Dickson, 5 S.W.3d at 356-57.
278. 15 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. App. Eastland 2000, no pet.).
279. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
280. 24 S.W.3d 362 (Tex. 2000).
281. TEX. R. Civ. P. 327(b); TEX. R. EvID. 606(b).
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and misconduct. In support of his contention, the plaintiff sought to in-
troduce affidavits from his attorney and three jurors regarding the acts of
another juror. The trial court denied the motion for new trial, concluding
that the affidavits were incompetent evidence because they pertained to
jury deliberations. The supreme court reversed the decision of a divided
lower court, which had concluded the trial court erred in limiting the evi-
dence available to prove misconduct. In so holding, the supreme court
rejected the petitioner's argument that Rule 327(a) 282 creates an excep-
tion to Rule 327(b) 283 that would allow a juror to testify regarding jury
deliberations to prove juror misconduct in voir dire. Instead, the court
held that Rule 327(b) does not preclude testimony from a juror regarding
outside influences brought to bear on jurors; nor does it prohibit a juror
from testifying about reasons to disqualify another juror, provided, how-
ever, that the relevant information was not obtained during jury delibera-
tions. 284 The court clarified that, contrary to the holding of several lower
appellate courts,285 the term "jury deliberations" refer only to that period
when the jury weighs the evidence to arrive at a verdict, but does not
include conduct or discussions that occur before the charge is read and
formal deliberations begin. 286 Here, the court concluded that the evi-
dence presented regarding alleged juror misconduct prior to deliberations
was admissible, but that such evidence failed to establish juror miscon-
duct sufficient to warrant a new trial.287 As to plaintiff's complaint that
Rules 327(b)288 and 606(b) 289 violated his due process rights, the court
concluded that these rules could not be viewed in isolation from the other
procedural safeguards relating to the goal of a fair and impartial jury and
that other mechanisms existed to ensure such a result, without violating
the sanctity of jury deliberations.290
Crowson v. The Kansas City S. Ry. Co.,291 also involved allegations of
jury misconduct in a railway personal injury case where a juror brought a
textbook into the deliberating room that contained tables used to dis-
count lost future wages to their present value. The appellate court held
282. TEX. R. Civ. P. 327(a).
283. TEX. R. Civ. P. 327(b).
284. Golden Eagle, 24 S.W.3d at 371-72.
285. Baley v. W/W Interests, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 313, 316 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1988, writ denied), and its progeny had held that jury deliberations include commu-
nications regarding the case that occur between and among jurors, regardless of the time
and place where the discussions occur.
286. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 955 S.W.2d 300, 322 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1997, no writ); Durbin v. Dal-Briar Corp., 871 S.W.2d 263, 272 (Tex. App.-
El Paso 1994, writ denied); Wilson v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dept., 853 S.W.2d 825, 831
(Tex. App.-Austin 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 886 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. 1994).
287. Golden Eagle, 24 S.W.3d at 372.
288. TEX. R. Civ. P. 327(b).
289. TEX. R. EvID. 606(b).
290. For example, the court noted that jurors may be questioned by voir dire during
trial and corrective actions taken, the jurors may be polled, and attorneys are permitted to
contact jurors to discuss the case, provided that the contact is respectful. Golden Eagle, 24
S.W.3d at 375.
291. 11 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1999, no pet. h.).
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that such information did not constitute an "outside influence" sufficient
to render it admissible to prove juror misconduct, especially where the
information contained in the textbook was essentially identical to what
one of the experts presented at trial.292
Two appellate courts wrestled with the mechanisms for jury shuffles
under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure during the Survey period. In
Whiteside v. Watson293 counsel for one of the defendants requested a jury
shuffle under Rule 223,294 as a result of which the bailiff took the jury
cards, and shuffled them face down like a deck of playing cards. The
cards were then turned face up and the jurors were reseated according to
the new order. The trial was then adjourned for lunch. Although counsel
for one of the plaintiffs not a party to the appeal was present for this
event, counsel for the appellee was not. Following the lunch recess, coun-
sel for the appellee and counsel for the co-plaintiff successfully sought a
new shuffle because the original shuffling methodology failed to comply
with Rule 223's295 requirements that the juror cards be placed in a recep-
tacle, shuffled, and drawn by the presiding judge. Following this second
shuffle, done over appellants' objection that Rule 223296 only permits one
shuffle, the jury was seated.
On appeal, the appellant court rejected a myriad of arguments regard-
ing the "second" shuffle. First, the appellate court held that a literal
translation of the last sentence of Rule 223,297 which permits only one
shuffle, would do violence to prior language in that rule, mandating the
use of a receptacle to shuffle the jury cards. Therefore, the appellate
court held that it was proper to conduct a second shuffle that complied
with the technical requirements of the rule regarding the manner of the
shuffle itself. Second, the court rejected appellants' argument that the
second shuffle did not comply the technical requirements of Rule 223298
that "the presiding judge" (rather than the bailiff) actually retrieves the
cards from the receptacle. 299 Third, the court rejected appellants' conten-
tion that because the appellee did not object during the first shuffle, it
waived any right to complain, such that the trial court should never have
performed the second shuffle. Finally, the court concluded that even if
error did occur, it was harmless because the appellant failed to show that
the "double shuffle" likely resulted in the rendition of an improper
verdict.
292. Id. at 304-05.
293. 12 S.W.3d 614 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, pet. denied).





299. The court noted a technical discrepancy in the language of Rule 223. The first
portion of the rule states that the trial court shall cause the names of all members of such
assigned jury panel to be placed in a receptacle, then shuffled and drawn, but the last
portion of the Rule states that the shuffle and drawing shall be done by the trial judge.
However, the court rejected the technical argument that a shuffle and draw by the bailiff
(as opposed to the trial court itself) was reversible error. Whiteside, 12 S.W.3d at 619-20.
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In Carr v. Smith,300 a medical malpractice case, the parties agreed upon
a lengthy confidential juror questionnaire, which was presented to a seg-
regated panel of potential jurors on the first day of trial. The next morn-
ing, after this panel had been viewed by representatives for both sides
and after the parties had reviewed the panel's responses to the lengthy
questionnaire, counsel for one of the defendants requested a jury shuffle.
Over the plaintiffs' objection, the trial court permitted the panel to be
shuffled. The trial then proceeded to verdict, though the plaintiffs non-
suited the defendant that had successfully requested the jury shuffle prior
to verdict. Following the entry of the verdict in favor of the remaining
defendant, the plaintiffs moved unsuccessfully for a mistrial and a new
trial based upon the jury shuffle. The appellate court concluded that al-
though the party who requested the shuffle was no longer before the
court, the case must, nonetheless, be remanded for a new trial. In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court reasoned that under Rule 223,301 any shuffle
of the jury panel must occur "prior to voir dire examination by any party
• .." The court rejected the argument that voir dire begins when the
panel is brought into the courtroom, viewed by the attorneys, and oral
questioning has begun, reasoning that it should make no difference if the
parties acquire information about potential jurors from oral or written
questions. Once the process has begun, any shuffle of the jury is im-
proper because it destroys the randomness inherent in the original jury
panel list selection. In light of the foregoing, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs need not demonstrate harmful error as the Whiteside court re-
quired. Rather, the Carr court reasoned that "the improper grant of [sic]
shuffle is tantamount to a denial of one's right to a trial by jury. '302
Therefore, the court adopted a "relaxed" harmless error standard, requir-
ing only that the complaining party show that the trial was materially
unfair, without having to show more.303 Since this case was hotly con-
tested with sharply conflicting evidence, the court determined that the
plaintiffs were not required to show additional harmful error and there-
fore remanded the case.
Two Houston courts struggled with the issue of parties appearing
before the jury in shackles during the Survey period and reached vastly
different conclusions about the harm of such an event. In Carson v.
Gomez304 the plaintiff, a prisoner in the state penitentiary at the time,
sued several prison guards, alleging that they attacked him. Following a
verdict for the guards, the plaintiff appealed, claiming that the trial court
erred in refusing to discharge the panel after it saw him enter the court-
room wearing prison garb and handcuffs. Although the court noted the
general rule that, except for good cause, no one should be tried while
restrained (and if one is restrained, the judge should try to minimize the
300. 22 S.W.3d 128 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet.).
301. TEX. R. Civ. P. 223.
302. Carr, 22 S.W.3d at 134.
303. Id. at 136.
304. 14 S.W.3d 778 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
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potential for harm) the court concluded that the record did not reflect the
plaintiff's restraint during the entire trial. At most, the court held, the
jury saw the plaintiff enter the courtroom momentarily restrained by
handcuffs. The majority expressly rejected the plaintiff's unsworn (but
unrebutted) statement in his brief that he was restrained during the entire
trial, holding that appellate Rule 38.1305 did not require it to take the
word of a convicted felon. Although acknowledging that restraints could
be prejudicial where the jury is required to determine the attacker's iden-
tity, the court concluded that no harmful error occurred, apparently
choosing not to believe that the record established the plaintiff's claim
that he was restrained before the jury for more than a moment.
By stark contrast, an en banc panel of the Houston appellate court in
In the Interest of K.R., a Child306 withdrew its prior opinion discussed in
last year's Survey article 30 7 and held that the appellant's appearance
before the jury in shackles was harmful error and remanded the case for a
new trial. In this case, the State of Texas and the Department of Protec-
tive and Regulatory Services filed suit to terminate the appellant's paren-
tal rights after he had been convicted of striking and killing his wife's son
from a prior relationship. Although the appellate court concluded that
the evidence before the jury was clearly sufficient to support its decision
to terminate the appellant's parental rights, it concluded that the case
must be remanded for a new trial because the trial court (over the appel-
lant's objection and warnings from all counsel) left the appellant re-
strained during the entire proceeding. Determining that the issue of
whether requiring the appellant to appear before the jury in shackles vio-
lated his constitutional rights was one of first impression, the court con-
cluded that one's parental rights are fundamental and enjoy a strong
presumption.30 8 Moreover, when an individual's level of dangerousness
is a question for the jury to decide, it would violate an individual's right to
a fair trial to compel that person to appear and remain before the jury
bound in physical restraints, particularly in the absence of a finding by the
trial court that such restraint was necessary.
The court in Allen v. Blackledge30 9 held that it was reversible error to
allow a case to proceed to trial when similarly aligned parties had im-
properly coordinated their peremptory strikes. In this real estate dispute,
a group of 36 homeowners sued their subdivision and its developers
under a variety of theories. Prior to empaneling the jury, the trial court
granted six strikes each to the two groups of defendants, having con-
cluded that their interests were sufficiently adverse to warrant such an
arrangement. 310 The trial court also ordered those defendants to exercise
their peremptory strikes independently. After the strikes had been made,
305. TEx. R. App. P. 38.1.
306. 22 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
307. 2000 Annual Survey at 1305.
308. Id. at 93.




the plaintiffs' counsel objected, noting the complete lack of duplication
among the defendants in their strikes. The trial court then determined
that the two groups of defendants, while having exercised their strike
rights independently, had secretly agreed in advance that one group
would exercise its rights from the top of the list while the other group
would draw from the bottom. The appellate court reversed the trial
court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a mistrial, holding that such
coordination between the defendants constituted reversible error.311 The
appellate court further rejected the defendants' argument that any error
had been waived, noting that the plaintiffs could not have determined the
defendants' collusion until after it occurred and its results became
obvious.312
In Garcia v. Spohn Health Sys. Corp.,313 which involved a medical mal-
practice claim, the court wrestled with how to treat a verdict where the
jury was deadlocked regarding a doctor's liability, yet unanimous in its
finding that the hospital was not liable. Based upon this verdict, the trial
court entered a judgment in favor of the hospital and declared a mistrial
regarding the remaining case. The appellate court affirmed the judgment
based on the partial verdict, noting that Texas law requires the entry of
judgment based upon the verdict when possible.314
XII. JURY CHARGE
The Texas Supreme Court in Crown Life Ins. Co. v. CasteeP 5 held that
a judgment entered on a single, broad form jury question that included
several invalid liability theories was harmful error where it was not possi-
ble to distinguish between the legally valid and invalid bases for the jury's
verdict. In this vanishing premium life insurance case, the insureds sued
both their insurer and agent regarding alleged misrepresentations made
about their life insurance policy. The agent, meanwhile, asserted cross-
claims against the insurer, including alleged violations of the Texas De-
ceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act ("DTPA") 316 and the
Texas Insurance Code.317 The trial court submitted a single, broad form
question to the jury (over the insurer's timely and specific objections)
regarding the insurer's liability to the agent, that included the DTPA and
Insurance Code claims. The high court held that the while the agent had
standing under these statutes to assert some of his claims against the in-
surer, he lacked standing to assert other theories of liability.318 Because
the charge included both valid and invalid liability theories, it was not
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. 19 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. denied).
314. Id. at 510.
315. 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. 2000); see Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Stokes, 20 S.W.3d 45
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet. h.).
316. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41, et. seq. (Vernon 1987).
317. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 § 16a (Vernon 1981).
318. Crown Life, 22 S.W.3d at 389.
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possible to determine the bases for the jury's verdict. Therefore the court
concluded that it was entirely possible that the jury had reached its con-
clusions based upon invalid liability theories and reversed the judgment
in favor of the agent. The court disapproved of several appellate court
decisions319 which held such error to be harmless if any evidence supports
a properly submitted liability theory.
The supreme court again considered Texas Workers' Compensation Ins.
Fund v. Mandlbauer320 during the Survey period, and reversed and ren-
dered judgment for the insurance fund.321 In this worker's compensation
dispute, the employee injured his back at work and then left his employer
the following year. After changing jobs, the employee claimed that a sub-
sequent back injury was the result of the prior incident, which the insur-
ance carrier disputed. The trial court entered judgment for the insurer
consistent with the jury's verdict, from which the employee appealed.
The employee alleged that the trial court erred in refusing to submit a
requested instruction regarding whether the incident was a "producing
cause" or the injury "resulted from" incident. The court held that be-
cause neither the plaintiff's pleadings, the statute, nor the charge were
framed under a "producing cause" theory, it was not an abuse of discre-
tion for. the trial court to refuse such an instruction. 322 Therefore, the
supreme court reversed the appellate court's decision remanding the case
for a new trial and rendered judgment for the insurer.
The high court in Borneman v. Steak & Ale of Texas, Inc.32 3 reversed
and remanded a dram shop case back to the appellate court for consider-
ation of issues not reached, holding that while the jury charge was incor-
rect regarding an element of the plaintiff's claim, the error in the charge
was a defect and not an omission, such that the charge was "not 'so defec-
tive"' to warrant a rendition of the judgment.32 4 In the Interest of
V.L.K. 32 5 involved a child custody case, and the supreme court held that
because the statutory parental presumption applies only in original cus-
tody determinations, not in a suit to modify custody rights, the trial court
did not err in refusing to submit such an instruction to the jury.326
In Molina v. Moore327 the appellate court reversed and rendered judg-
ment consistent with the jury verdict for damages following deliberations
in which the jury was given a single broad form question regarding dam-
319. See Crown Life, at 389 (citing Provident Am. Ins. Co. v. Castaneda, 914 S.W.2d
273 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 988 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1998); Hart v.
Berko, Inc., 881 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied); Bernstein v. Portland
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 850 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied); Ford
Motor Co. v. Pool, 688 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985), affd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds, 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986)).
320. 34 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2000).
321. 2000 Annual Survey at 1366.
322. Texas Workers', 39 S.W.3d at 300.
323. 22 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. 2000).
324. Id. at 413.
325. 24 S.W.3d 388 (Tex. 2000).
326. Id. at 339-40.
327. 33 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet. h.).
2001] 1665
SMU LAW REVIEW
ages, and in response provided a written answer that included handwrit-
ten notations that appeared to show how the jury apportioned its damage
number among several different elements. The trial court had used the
jury's notations to apportion damages among three topics in the single,
broad form question. The appellate court reversed, holding that while
the marginal notations may have reflected the jury's deliberative
processes, they could not be used to enter a judgment for less than the
total amount awarded by the jury in response to this single question, to
which neither side objected.328
XIII. JUDGMENTS
While the effect of Mother Hubbard clauses, 329 particularly in the sum-
mary judgment context, continued to plague lower appellate courts330
during the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court in Lehmann v. Har-
Con Corp.331 attempted to again clarify the standard for determining the
finality of judgments in cases disposed of without a conventional trial on
the merits. The court concluded that "[w]e no longer believe that a
Mother Hubbard clause in an order or in a judgment issued without a full
trial can be taken to indicate finality. '332 In Lehmann, the supreme court
reversed and remanded two appeals from summary judgment orders that
each contained a Mother Hubbard clause, but that did not dispose of all
parties, claims, and issues. In so doing, the high court held that
in cases in which only one final and appealable judgment can be ren-
dered, a judgment issued without a conventional trial is final for pur-
poses of appeal if and only if either it actually disposes of all claims
and parties then before the court, regardless of its language, or it
states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all
claims and all parties.333
The court, after surveying the development of Texas law regarding the
finality of judgments, noted that determining with certainty when a judge-
ment is final "has proved elusive. '334 As a result, parties who are unsure
of the finality of a judgment must err in favor of appealing or risk losing
the right to appeal. To illustrate its point, the court stated that:
[a] judgment that finally disposes of all remaining parties and claims,
based on the record in the case, is final, regardless of its language. A
judgment that actually disposes of every remaining issue in a case is
not interlocutory merely because it recites that it is partial or refers
328. Id. at 325.
329. A Mother Hubbard clause refers to language in a judgment to the effect that "all
relief not granted herein is denied."
330. See, e.g., Kistler v. Stran, 22 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no
pet.); Harris County v. Nash, 22 S.W.3d 46 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet.
filed); Scott v. Poindexter, No. 04-98-00101-CV, 2001 WL 273086 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
Mar. 21, 2001, no pet. h.).
331. 44 Tex. S. Ct. J. 364 (Feb. 1, 2001), 2000 WL 33146410 (Feb. 1, 2001).
332. Id. at *1.
333. Id.
334. Id. at *4.
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to only some of the parties or claims.335
Further the court held that "the language of an order or judgment can
make it final, even though it should have been interlocutory, if that lan-
guage expressly disposes of all claims and all parties. ' 336 Thus, the court
reversed its prior holding in Mafrige v. Ross337 and held that "the inclu-
sion of a Mother Hubbard clause-by which we mean the statement 'all
relief not granted is denied,' or essentially those words-does not indi-
cate that a judgment rendered without a conventional trial is final for
purposes of appeal. '338 The court further strongly suggested that a state-
ment like "This judgment finally disposes of all parties and all claims and
is appealable" would accurately indicate the trial court's intent to issue a
final appealable judgment and should be included by practitioners and
trial courts in their summary judgment orders. 339
Post-answer default judgments were also the subject of review during
the Survey period. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Withrow v.
Schou340 declined to follow the holding of its sister court in Transoceanic
Shipping Co. v. Gen. Universal Sys., Inc.,341 regarding the propriety of a
default judgment taken where notice to the defaulting party was in ques-
tion. The court in Transoceanic held that a post-answer default judgment
was improper where the record conclusively showed that the notice letter
from the clerk of the setting at issue was returned to the clerk stamped
"RETURN TO SENDER; UNDELIVERABLE AS ADDRESSED;
FORWARDING ORDER EXPIRED. '342 By contrast, the court in the
Withrow case held that where the clerk sends notice to the last known
address of a party or its attorney, the clerk has fulfilled its legal obligation
under Rule 245,343 which imposes upon the party or its attorney an obli-
gation to notify the court of a current mailing address.344 Because the
clerk sent the notice at issue to the appellant's last known address, the
court rejected the appellant's due process concerns that a default judg-
ment was taken without proper notice. In a variation on the theme, the
court in Palacios v. Winters345 reversed and remanded a post-answer de-
fault judgment, holding that the trial court erred in failing to grant the
appellant's motion for new trial where the appellant failed to appear at
335. Id. at *8.
336. Id. (emphasis added).
337. 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1993).
338. Lehmann, 2000 WL 33146410 at *10.
339. Id. at *14. Justice Baker issued a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the
majority's end result, but suggested instead that trial court's summary judgment orders
specify (1) the claims brought by each party, (2) the grounds upon which summary judg-
ment was sought, (3) each ground upon which the trial court granted summary judgment,
and (4) each ground upon which the trial court denied summary judgment. Id. at *16
(Baker, J., concurring).
340. 13 S.W.3d 37 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
341. 961 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.).
342. Id. at 420.
343. TEX. R. Civ. P. 245.
344. Withrow, 13 S.W.3d at 41.
345. 26 S.W.3d 734 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.).
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trial, but the clerk had failed to send a written order memorializing the
jury trial setting, as required under Rule 166.346
Collateral attacks on judgments were also the subject of appellate re-
view during the Survey period. In Simmons v. Compania Financiera
Libano, S.A. 347 involving an oil and gas dispute, the parties entered into a
Rule 11 agreement to resolve the case. The trial court then entered an
agreed judgment that incorporated some, but not all, of the terms of the
Rule 11 agreement, and which contained a Mother Hubbard clause stat-
ing that all relief not granted by way of a claim or a counterclaim was
denied. Subsequently one of the parties allegedly failed to perform under
the terms of the Rule 11 agreement, following which the other party suc-
cessfully brought a second suit to enforce the terms of the agreement. The
appellate court held that because the agreed judgment contained a
Mother Hubbard clause, the second suit constituted an improper collat-
eral attack on the original agreed judgment.348 The court therefore re-
versed and rendered the judgment in the second suit, holding that the
agreed judgment effectively extinguished the Rule 11 agreement.
In Spera v. Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, P.C.349 a group of plain-
tiffs sued their attorneys over the attorneys' fees awarded to the lawyers
in the resolution of mass tort actions relating to polybutylene pipes used
in the construction of homes. Following the original settlement, the attor-
neys sought to enforce their contingency fee agreement and recover $87
million in fees and $20 million in reimbursements. The trial court con-
ducted a fairness hearing and reduced the fee to $37 million and the reim-
bursed expenses to $10 million. The plaintiffs then brought suit against
their attorneys, asserting a variety of claims, including breach of fiduciary
duty, all of which the trial court disposed of by summary judgment in
favor of the attorneys. On appeal, the court affirmed the summary judg-
ment decision, except for claims related to the plaintiffs' breach of fiduci-
ary duty claim, on which the appellate court reversed. The appellate
court rejected the attorneys' argument that the plaintiffs' claims consti-
tuted a collateral attack on the original decision of the trial court in the
fairness hearing, reasoning that, among other things, the plaintiffs were
not seeking to set aside the fee award but rather were alleging that the
attorneys breached a duty to disclose a conflict of interest, which was
distinct from an attack on the attorneys' fee award itself.350
The court in Purcell Constr., Inc. v. Welch351 affirmed and modified the
trial court's judgment to include the full amount of prejudgment interest
allowed by law. The trial court had decreased the amount of pre-judg-
ment interest awarded to the plaintiff on the basis of its docket conges-
tion. Noting that the trial court's docket is not one of the statutorily
346. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166.
347. 14 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
348. Id. at 340.
349. 25 S.W.3d 863 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no. pet.).
350. Id. at 871.
351. 17 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
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permissible reasons for modifying an award of pre-judgment interest, the
appellate court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the full amount of
pre-judgment interest permitted by law.352
XIV. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
The Texas Supreme Court in Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith Southern
Equip., Inc.353 held that a timely filed post-judgment motion for sanctions
extends the thirty-day period in which a trial court may exercise its ple-
nary power over its judgment. In this business dispute, three weeks after
the trial court initially granted the defendant's summary judgment mo-
tion, the defendant moved for sanctions and the rendition of a new final
judgment. Approximately two weeks after granting the original summary
judgment, the trial court entered a new judgment that included an award
of attorneys' fees as a sanction against the plaintiff. On appeal, the plain-
tiff contended that the trial court's plenary jurisdiction had expired thirty
days after the entry of the original judgment and that the subsequent
judgment, including the sanction award, was void. Construing Rule
329b,354 the court disagreed and held that although sanctions could not be
awarded after the expiration of a trial court's plenary jurisdiction, 355 a
timely filed post-judgment motion that seeks a substantive change in an
existing judgment qualifies as a motion to modify under Rule 329b(g),
and therefore extends both the trial court's plenary jurisdiction and the
appellate timetable. 356
The appellate court in Quanaim v. Frasco Restaurant & Catering357 re-
lied on the supreme court's reasoning in Lane Bank to determine which
of three summary judgment orders, all entered on different dates, dis-
posed of all issues and all parties such that it would be considered a final
judgment for purposes of calculating the timeliness of an appeal. In this
personal injury case, the defendants filed multiple summary judgment
motions, all of which the trial court granted via three separate orders,
issued on May 5, 11, and 18. The appellate court concluded that the May
11th summary judgment order, although not identified on its face as a
final order, disposed of all parties and all issues and was therefore the
operative order for calculating appellate timetables. The court was also
forced to address, however, whether the May 18th order could be consid-
ered as a modification of the May 11th order under the holding in Lane
Bank for the purposes of extending the appellate timetable. The court
concluded that the May 18th order, which identified a different ground
for summary judgment, should be construed as a "change" sufficient to
352. Id. at 403.
353. 10 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. 2000).
354. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.
355. See Lane at 311 (discussing Hjalmarson v Langley, 840 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App.-
Waco 1992, orig. proceeding)).
356. Id. at 314.
357. 17 S.W.3d 30 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
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restart the appellate timetable under Rule 329b(h).358
In Wembley Inv. Co. v. Herrera,359 the supreme court held that a party
was not precluded from seeking to set aside a default judgment by a bill
of review when it had initially diligently pursed a ruling on a motion for
new trial filed while the default judgment was still interlocutory. In this
slip and fall case, the plaintiff was injured at work and filed suit against
several parties. As a result of some confusion by the insurer for some of
the defendants, no answer was filed on behalf of the petitioner, and the
trial court entered an interlocutory default judgment against the peti-
tioner and others. Because the clerk failed to mail a notice of the default
judgment, however, the petitioner did not learn of its entry until approxi-
mately eight months later, and immediately filed both a motion for new
trial and a petition for a bill of review. Thereafter, unbeknownst to the
petitioner, certain subrogation claims were dismissed, which caused the
interlocutory default judgment to become final. The trial court granted
the bill of review and entered a take nothing judgment in favor of the
petitioner on summary judgment. However, the appellate court reversed,
holding that the petitioner had not been diligent in pursuing its motion
for new trial. The supreme court reversed and remanded to the appellate
court for consideration of the merits of the appeal, holding that the peti-
tioner's failure to pursue its motion for new trial resulted from the acci-
dents or wrongful acts of others and not from lack of due diligence.360
Interpreting the nuances of Rule 329b 361 regarding the "granting" and
"ungranting" of a motion for new trial, the court in Ferguson v. Globe-
Texas Co.362 dismissed an appeal as untimely. The trial court originally
entered a take-nothing judgment for the appellee, following which the
appellant timely moved for a new trial. Thereafter, outside the thirty-day
time period prescribed in Rule 329b(b), 363 the appellant filed an
amended motion for new trial. The trial court then entered an order that
appeared to grant both the timely motion for new trial and the untimely
amended motion for new trial. Approximately four months later, how-
ever, the trial court granted motions to reconsider the previous motion
for a new trial and reinstated the original take-nothing judgment. Al-
though recognizing a split in authority among several jurisdictions, the
appellate court dismissed the appeal, holding that because the motions to
reconsider were not timely, the order granting them was void. In so hold-
ing, the court reasoned that a contrary interpretation of Rule 329b(e) 364
might permit a trial court to try a case initially on its merits, then order
and hold a second trial, but then go back and overrule the motion for a
358. Id. at 39-40 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(h)).
359. 11 S.W.3d 924 (Tex. 1999) (per curium).
360. Id. at 928.
361. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.
362. 35 S.W.3d 688 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, no. pet. h.).
363. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(b).
364. TEX. R. Cv. P. 329b(e).
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new trial and enter a judgment on the first verdict.365 Therefore, the
court concluded that a trial court may only vacate an order granting a
new trial during the period in which its plenary power continues, i.e., 75
days after the date the judgment is signed.
XV. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
Objections to assigned judges continued to be a source of controversy
during the Survey period. In re Barrera366 involved a judge who was as-
signed under Section 74.053 of the Government Code367 on two separate
occasions. Because the assigned judge had heard a motion for protective
order in the case pursuant to the first assignment, he ruled that a party's
objection to his second assignment was untimely. 368 The court of appeals
disagreed, holding that the objection was timely since the judge had not
yet heard any matter under the second assignment. 369
The supreme court has previously explained that a judge assigned to
hear a recusal motion is subject to a party's right to object to the assign-
ment.370 The court in O.C.S., Inc. v. PI Energy Corp.371 elaborated on
this rule, holding that a party otherwise entitled to object to a judge as-
signed to hear a recusal motion is not deprived of that right simply be-
cause the assigned judge is a "regular" sitting judge of another court and
not a former or retired judge.372 The court distinguished the assignment
of a sitting judge pursuant to section 74.053373 from a transfer of the case
between district courts, the latter of which does not implicate the same
policy concerns. 374
In re Cuban375 addressed the procedural requirements for objecting to
an assigned judge. The visiting judge in that case signed an ex parte tem-
porary restraining order at the time suit was filed and set a hearing on the
application for temporary injunction. 376 Before the injunction hearing,
and at a time the district clerk's office was closed, the defendant filed a
motion to dissolve the restraining order and an objection to the visiting
judge with the sitting judge of another court. 377 The defendant also filed
a second objection at the time of the temporary injunction hearing, albeit
three minutes after the visiting judge took the bench, but the visiting
365. Ferguson, 35 S.W.3d at 691.
366. 9 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, orig. proceeding).
367. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 74.053 (Vernon 1998).
368. Barrera, 9 S.W.3d at 388-89.
369. Id. at 390.
370. In re Perritt, 992 S.W.2d 444, 445 (Tex. 1999).
371. 24 S.W.3d 548 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
372. Id. at 552-53.
373. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 74.053 (Vernon 1998).
374. PI Energy, 24 S.W.3d 554 at n. 8 (citing In re Houston Lighting & Power Co., 976
S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. 1998) (transfer of case to district court rendered moot prior assign-
ment of judge of that court to the case)).
375. 24 S.W.3d 381 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, orig. proceeding).




judge refused to recognize either objection.378 The court of appeals held,
however, that the defendant's first objection was proper and timely and
that disqualification was mandated. 379 The court reasoned that the objec-
tion was properly filed with a sitting judge at a time that the clerk's office
was closed.380 Moreover, the court held there was no requirement that
the objection be given to the visiting judge in order to have been effec-
tive.381 Finally, the court noted that while an objection must be filed
before the visiting judge takes the bench for action in the case, the defen-
dant's objection was not waived by virtue of the fact that the visiting
judge had entered a temporary restraining order without notice to the
defendant. 382
Finally, the court in Brosseau v. Ranzaut 383 was faced with the question
of whether a district judge was disqualified under Article V, Section 7 of
the Texas Constitution.38 4 Specifically, the defendant complained that
the district judge was not a member in good standing with the State Bar
of Texas at the time he signed the judgment in the case and that he was,
therefore, constitutionally disqualified from sitting. The court of appeals
disagreed, holding that the constitution requires only that a district judge
be licensed when he is initially elected.385
XVI. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
In re George386 addressed the extent to which an attorney should have
access to the work product of his predecessor counsel who has been dis-
qualified. 387 In a previous opinion, the supreme court disqualified plain-
tiff's original counsel because (1) their prior law firm had represented the
defendants in substantially related matters, and (2) they questioned the
validity of the work performed by their prior firm. 388 When new counsel
thereafter appeared for the plaintiff, the defendants took the position
that such counsel should not "receive, review or use" any of the disquali-
fied attorneys' work product.389 The trial court disagreed and entered an
order permitting the disqualified attorneys to transfer their entire file to
the successor attorneys, but prohibiting them from communicating with
each other any further about the case.390
378. Id.
379. Id. at 383. In light of this ruling, the court did not reach the issue of the timeliness
of the second objection. Id.
380. Cuban, 24 S.W.3d at 383.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. 28 S.W.3d 235 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, no pet. h.).
384. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 7 ("Each district judge shall be elected by the qualified vot-
ers at a General Election and shall be a citizen of the United States and of this State, who
is licensed to practice law in this State..
385. Brosseau, 28 S.W.3d at 236.
386. 28 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. 2000).
387. Id. at 512.
388. Id. (citing In re EPIC Holdings, 985 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1998)).
389. George, 28 S.W.3d at 512.
390. Id. at 514.
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In a lengthy opinion, the supreme court identified two separate issues.
First, the court held that, "when an attorney is disqualified, successor
counsel is presumptively entitled to obtain [from the disqualified attor-
ney] the pleadings, discovery, correspondence and all other materials in
the public record or exchanged by the parties. ''391 The court then turned
to the harder question of what access successor counsel should have to
work product and concluded that some type of restriction was necessary
in order to prevent the new attorneys from acquiring confidential infor-
mation of the adverse party.392 Surveying the approaches taken by vari-
ous courts around the country as to the extent of such a restriction, the
court found none of them fully satisfactory. 393 Accordingly, the court
created its own standard, which begins with a rebuttable presumption
that the work product contains confidential information of the disquali-
fied attorney's former client and should not, therefore, be provided to
successor counsel.394 This presumption can be rebutted by demonstrating
that there is not a substantial likelihood that the work product in question
contains or reflects such confidential information. 395
In addition to announcing the new governing standard, the supreme
court also provided guidance on the mechanisms by which it should be
applied. Specifically, the court noted that when the issue arises, the trial
judge should order the disqualified attorney to produce an inventory of
the work product, setting forth the type of work, the subject matter, the
claims to which it relates, and any other relevant factors. 396 The trial
court must then determine if the presumption has been rebutted, utilizing
such criteria as whether the particular work product concerns claims that
are unrelated to the prior representation or is otherwise of the type that is
unlikely to contain confidential information (e.g., deposition summaries,
legal research). 397 If the trial court cannot make its determination from
the inventory alone, it may consider other evidence presented or even
inspect the material in camera.398 If it is still uncertain, then the pre-
sumption remains unrebutted and the work product should not be turned
over.
3 9 9
391. Id. at 515.
392. Id. at 517.
393. Id.




398. Id. at 519.
399. George, 28 S.W.3d at 519. The dissent found the majority's procedure unworkable
and, in light of the importance of a lawyer's duty to protect a clients' confidences, advo-
cated a complete bar on the transfer of work product to successor counsel. Id. at 525-26





Of likely interest to practitioners, the court in In re Godt4°° held that a
legal malpractice claim arising from a medical malpractice suit consti-
tuted a claim for personal injuries (rather than a contractual claim or a
claim for economic injuries) under the Texas Arbitration Act 40 1 and that
the trial court therefore erred in compelling the client to arbitrate her
malpractice claims against the attorney. The court declined to reach the
client's claim that the arbitration agreement with her attorney was void
under public policy, but did note that Rule 1.08 of the Texas Disciplinary
Rules prohibits an attorney from making "an arrangement prospectively
limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted
by law and the client is independently represented in making the
agreement. "402
Courts reached vastly divergent results on what acts were sufficient to
constitute a waiver of one's rights to arbitration during the Survey period.
In Pennzoil Co v. Arnold Oil Co.,40 3 and In re Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's, 40 4 the court held that parties to arbitration agreements had not
waived their rights to compel the enforcement of such agreements by:
seeking and obtaining a severance; successfully moving for summary
judgment on choice of law issues; filing a petition and an answer and then
participating in a three-week rescission trial to verdict; taking more than
75 depositions; and conducting extensive written discovery (Lloyd's); or
unsuccessfully moving for a change of venue; serving written discovery
and participating in depositions; requesting a continuance of the trial
date; and filing a motion for summary judgment the same day it filed a
motion to compel arbitration (Pennzoil).
In contrast, in Menna v. Romero,405 involving a dispute between an
insurance agency and its agents, the defendant answered a suit and con-
currently moved to compel arbitration. That same day, the defendant also
filed a motion for continuance of the preliminary injunction hearing. On
the first day of the injunction hearing, the defendant also filed a plea to
the jurisdiction and a motion to abate based upon the arbitration agree-
ment. Nevertheless, the trial court held that the defendant had waived its
400. 28 S.W.3d 732 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no. pet. h.).
401. Id. at 738; TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.001, et. seq. (Vernon 1997 &
Supp. 2001).
402. Id. at 739 n.7 (quoting Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof'l Conduct 1.08(g), reprinted in
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (Vernon 1998)). See also In re Turner
Brothers Trucking Co., 8 S.W.3d 370, 377 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet.) (holding
that arbitration agreement between employee and company retained by employer to re-
solve disputes was unconscionable under federal law and thus unenforceable where em-
ployee was functionally illiterate and could not have knowingly consented to arbitrate his
personal injury claims).
403. 30 S.W.3d 494 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet. h.).
404. 18 S.W.3d 867 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, no pet.).




right to enforce the arbitration agreement by participating in the injunc-
tion hearing without first urging its motion to compel arbitration. The
appellate court reversed, noting that plaintiff failed to prove that he
would be adversely affected by the arbitration.40 6
The court in In Re MHI Partnership, Ltd.407 conditionally granted a
writ of mandamus and ordered the trial court to rule on a pending motion
to compel arbitration upon which the trial court had declined to rule ei-
ther way until after the completion of discovery. The court in In re Jebbia
408 also conditionally granted a writ of mandamus regarding the enforce-
ability of an arbitration agreement and held that the trial court was re-
quired to hold an evidentiary hearing on that issue where the summary
judgment-type evidence before it raised a fact question regarding the en-
forceability of the arbitration agreement.
Construing section 171.098(a)(3) of the Texas Civil Practice and Reme-
dies Code, 40 9 the court in Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Vondergoltz4 10 dismissed
an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the trial court's denial of
an application to confirm an arbitration award and simultaneous granting
of an application to vacate an arbitration award were not subject to an
interlocutory appeal. Noting that this was an issue of first impression for
Texas state courts, the appellate court looked to the Fifth Circuit's 411 in-
terpretation of a prior version of the state statute,412 and concurred with
the Fifth Circuit's view, that the statute did not permit such an appeal. 413
B. SANCTIONS
Appellate courts consistently affirmed sanction awards during the Sur-
vey period arising under a variety of scenarios. For example, in Randolph
v. Jackson Walker L.L.P.,414 the court affirmed a Rule 13415 death penalty
sanction in a defamation case where the plaintiffs had sued a television
station, one of its reporters, and their attorneys. The trial court granted a
motion for sanctions brought by the defendant attorneys and struck the
plaintiffs' pleadings against those defendants. Thereafter, the plaintiffs
amended their pleadings, but excluded any reference to the attorneys in
their amended petition. The appellate court affirmed the sanction award,
first holding that by amending their pleadings to omit any reference to
the attorneys, the plaintiffs had effectively non-suited their claims against
those defendants and therefore waived their right to complain about the
sanction award on appeal.416 Notwithstanding the waiver, however, the
406. Id. at *3.
407. 7 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.)
408. 26 S.W.3d 753 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2000, no pet. h.).
409. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.098(a)(3)(Vernon).
410. 14 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
411. Atlantic Aviation, Inc. v. EBM Group, Inc., 11 F.3d 1276 (5th Cir. 1994).
412. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 238-2 (repealed).
413. Prudential, 14 S.W.3d at 330-31.
414. 29 S.W.3d 271 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2000, no pet. h.).
415. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13.
416. Id. at 274.
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court further affirmed the death penalty sanction, citing as evidence an
offer by the plaintiffs' counsel before the sanction hearing to dismiss the
plaintiffs' claims against the attorneys in exchange for their agreement to
withdraw from representing the remaining defendant. The court held
that this offer evidenced that the plaintiffs' claims against the attorneys
were brought solely for purposes of harassment in attempting to coerce
the defendants' counsel to withdraw.417
In Skepnek v. Mynatt,41 8 the court imposed a $30,000 sanction against
an attorney for initially filing a special appearance affidavit that was later
proved false during depositions, after which the attorney again proffered
the same false affidavit in another special appearance pleading. The ap-
pellate court affirmed the sanction, holding that by first failing to with-
draw the false affidavit and then filing it a second time, the attorney
violated section 10.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 419
The court in Roberts v. Rose420 affirmed a sanction award levied
against an attorney after the trial court ordered the parties to mediation
at which neither the plaintiff nor his counsel appeared. Although the
monetary sanction award was originally issued against both the plaintiff
and his attorney, the trial court later rescinded the sanction against the
plaintiff after he testified that he did not appear at the mediation because
his attorney advised him not to attend due to a scheduling conflict, after
which the subject was never discussed again. However, the appellate
court let stand the sanction award against the attorney for essentially
neglecting the case and misinforming his client. 421
C. OTHER RULINGS
The Texas Supreme Court in Qwest Communications Corp. v. AT&T
Corp.422 held that a trial court's interlocutory order constituted a tempo-
rary injunction and was thus appealable under section 51.014(a)(4) of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. This suit arose out of a dispute
between two telecommunications companies regarding damages sus-
tained to fiber optic cables. After AT&T obtained an ex parte temporary
restraining order, the parties announced to the court at the temporary
injunction hearing that they had resolved the dispute made the subject of
the injunction hearing and then read their agreement into the record.
The trial court issued an oral ruling rendering judgment on the applica-
tion for temporary injunction and instructed the parties to submit a writ-
ten order. The parties could not agree to the terms of the written order
and, following a subsequent clarification hearing, the trial court signed an
order that matched the agreement previously read into the record, from
417. Id. at 281.
418. 8 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1999, pet. denied).
419. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM CODE ANN. § 10.001 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 2000).
420. 37 S.W.3d 31 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet. h.).
421. Id. at 35.
422. 24 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. 2000).
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which Qwest appealed. The supreme court held that because the order,
made effective immediately, restricted Qwest's operations during the
pendency of the litigation, it qualified as a temporary injunction, even
though the order did not set the cause for trial or set an amount for a
bond.423 The high court reasoned that, while the absence of these two
elements subjected the order to being attacked as void, it did not change
the order's function or classification as an injunctive order, which sub-
jected it to an interlocutory appeal.
423. Id. at 338.
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